Catalogue


Moral perception [electronic resource] /
Robert Audi.
imprint
Princeton : Princeton University Press, c2013.
description
xii, 180 p. ; 22 cm.
ISBN
9780691156484 (hardcover : alk. paper)
format(s)
Book
Subjects
More Details
imprint
Princeton : Princeton University Press, c2013.
isbn
9780691156484 (hardcover : alk. paper)
restrictions
Licensed for access by U. of T. users.
catalogue key
9872246
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
Excerpts
Flap Copy
"This book defends the most illuminating and novel theory of moral perception to date. In making a case for objectivity in ethics, Robert Audi insightfully explores the relations between moral perception, intuition, emotion, and imagination. His clear and engaging style, and his use of many examples to explain and illuminate the key distinctions and ideas, makes the book accessible to students, while its substantial contribution to ethical theory makes it a must-read for experts."-- Mark Timmons, University of Arizona "I don't know of any other work in recent years that has examined moral perception so thoroughly or with such epistemological sophistication. Audi's book makes an important contribution to the unduly neglected field of moral epistemology, and it should interest a broad philosophical audience."-- Noah Lemos, College of William and Mary
Flap Copy
"This book defends the most illuminating and novel theory of moral perception to date. In making a case for objectivity in ethics, Robert Audi insightfully explores the relations between moral perception, intuition, emotion, and imagination. His clear and engaging style, and his use of many examples to explain and illuminate the key distinctions and ideas, makes the book accessible to students, while its substantial contribution to ethical theory makes it a must-read for experts."--Mark Timmons, University of Arizona "I don't know of any other work in recent years that has examined moral perception so thoroughly or with such epistemological sophistication. Audi's book makes an important contribution to the unduly neglected field of moral epistemology, and it should interest a broad philosophical audience."--Noah Lemos, College of William and Mary
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 2013-09-01:
Audi (Univ. of Notre Dame) here argues in favor of objectivity in ethics by defending the possibility of moral perceptions. In other words, he maintains that one can literally see or hear wrongdoing and that moral knowledge is at least in part empirical knowledge. In his view, moral knowledge integrates one's perceptions and a priori moral principles. He does not, however, naturalize moral properties or make them response dependent, and in this way distinguishes his view from older moral sense theories of moral perception and knowledge. Audi's writing is characteristically clear, careful, and accessible. He has interesting things to say regarding how emotions are connected to moral intuitions, and concerning the possibility of a distinct kind of emotion for each type of basic moral obligation. Also of interest is his discussion of how moral imagination can be understood as "a nexus of intuition, emotion, and perception." All in all, this excellent book furthers Audi's recent attempts to develop a modest form of moral intuitionism. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-level undergraduates through researchers/faculty. J. H. Spence Adrian College
Reviews
This item was reviewed in:
Choice, September 2013
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Summaries
Bowker Data Service Summary
The contents of this book cover perception and moral knowledge, major kinds of perception, the perception of right and wrong, moral perception as a basis of moral knowledge, the role of intuition in aesthetic experience, and much more.
Main Description
We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions --distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.
Table of Contents
Prefacep. vii
Acknowledgmentsp. xi
Introductionp. 1
Perception and Moral Knowledgep. 5
Perception: Sensory, Conceptual, and Cognitive Dimensionsp. 7
Major Kinds of Perceptionp. 8
The Phenomenology and Content of Perceptionp. 12
The Basis of Veridical Perceptionp. 21
Moral Perception: Causal, Phenomenological, and Epistemological Elementsp. 30
The Perception of Right and Wrongp. 30
The Representational Character of Moral Perceptionp. 38
Perception as a Direct Source of Moral Knowledgep. 51
Perception and Inferencep. 51
Can Moral Perception Be Naturalized?p. 55
Moral Perception as a Basis of Moral Knowledgep. 58
Ethical Intuition, Emotional Sensibility, and Moral Judgmentp. 67
Perceptual Grounds, Ethical Disagreement, and Moral Intuitionsp. 69
Does Moral Disagreement Undermine Justification in Ethics?p. 70
The Concept of an Intuitionp. 83
Intuitions as Apprehensionsp. 96
Moral Perception, Aesthetic Perception, and Intuitive Judgmentp. 103
The Role of Intuition in Aesthetic Experiencep. 103
Aesthetic and Moral Properties: Comparison and Contrastp. 106
The Rule-Governed Element in Ethics and Aestheticsp. 109
The Reliability of Intuitionp. 112
Emotion and Intuition as Sources of Moral Judgmentp. 121
Emotion and Intuition: Interaction and Integrationp. 122
The Evidential Role of Emotion in Moral Mattersp. 136
The Place of Emotion and Moral Intuition in Normative Ethicsp. 143
Emotion and Moral Intuitionp. 143
Moral Imagination as a Nexus of Intuition, Emotion, and Perceptionp. 157
Intuition and Moral Judgmentp. 161
Conclusionp. 170
Indexp. 175
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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