Catalogue


Prometheus shackled : Goldsmith Banks and England's financial revolution after 1700 /
Peter Temin, Hans-Joachim Voth.
imprint
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, c2013.
description
ix, 214 p.
ISBN
019994427X (hardcover), 9780199944279 (hardcover)
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
author
added author
imprint
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, c2013.
isbn
019994427X (hardcover)
9780199944279 (hardcover)
contents note
Earning and spending in eighteenth-century London -- The financial revolution -- Goldsmith Banks -- Borrowers, investors and usury laws -- The south sea bubble -- The triumph of boring banking -- Finance and slow growth during the industrial revolution -- Conclusions.
catalogue key
8738368
 
Includes bibliographical references (p. [192]-202) and index.
A Look Inside
Reviews
Review Quotes
"A major contribution to economic history, business history, social history, and economics,Prometheus Shackledresolves a great enigma about the Industrial Revolution by explaining why economic growth was so slow despite massive technical change."--Philip T. Hoffman, California Institute of Technology "Based on newly opened archival material, two economists have written a sparkling and provocative book on how banking worked in the past that will force all scholars working in the area to re-examine their notions about the economics of the British Industrial Revolution, the importance of banking and finance in economic development, and the role that government regulation has played in the process of capital accumulation and industrialization."--Joel Mokyr, Northwestern University; author ofThe Enlightened Economy "Peter Temin and Joachim Voth have written a marvelous blend of business history and economic analysis. Their careful study of Hoares Bank documents the origins of modern banking and relates the story to the state's insatiable demand for credit to finance war.Prometheus Shackledis a pleasure to read and calls into question many grand narratives that seek to explain the rise of the West."--Bob Allen, University of Oxford; author ofThe British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective "In a world still hobbled by the unchecked excesses of modern finance, this timely study of Industrial Revolution banking reminds us that bankers are as important for growth as engineers. Indeed, the authors argue, too few bankers in eighteenth century London limited economic growth much more than too many in the untrammeled City of today."--Greg Clark, University of California, Davis; author ofA Farewell to Alms "This is an important work, and it is written in an engaging style. The authors integrate goldsmith banking operations with the history of the rise of the nation state's finances and military aspirations, the broader economic trends that gave rise to industrialization, the rise of the middle class and the changing distribution of wealth, and evolving societal attitudes that accompanied industrialization. The central thesis of the book--that England's constrained banking system served sovereign interests at the expense of private interests during the early industrial revolution (1760-1830)--is argued persuasively."--Charles Calomiris, Columbia University "Prometheus Shackledsolves a major puzzle: Why during the first Industrial Revolution was Britain's economic growth anemic? The authors show that financial and other policies diverted credit from the private economy to the government, making it easier for the British state to finance its numerous wars. With implications for both history and our own financially and economically troubled times, this is an important book."--Richard Sylla, New York University
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Summaries
Long Description
After 1688, Britain underwent a revolution in public finance, and the cost of borrowing declined sharply. Leading scholars have argued that easier credit for the government, made possible by better property-rights protection, lead to a rapid expansion of private credit, and see the Industrial Revolution as a result of the preceding revolution in public finance. In this Prometheus Shackled, prominent economic historians Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth examine this hypothesis using new, detailed archival data from 18th century banks. They conclude the opposite: the financial revolution led to an explosion of public debt, but it stifled private credit. This resulted in markedly slower growth in the English economy. Temin and Voth collected detailed data from several goldsmith banks-Child's, Gosling's, Freame and Gould, Hoare's, and Duncome andKent. The authors look closely at Hoare's, founded by Sir Richard Hoare in 1672, because of its excellent records. Numerous entrants tried their hand at the new business of deposit banking; few survived and fewer thrived. Hoare's and a small group of competitors did both. Temin and Voth chart their growth inthe face frequent wars and heavy-handed regulations. This new data allows insights into the interaction between financial and economic development. Government regulations such as setting a maximum interest rate caused severe misallocation of credit; a misguided attempt to lighten the nation's debt burden led directly to the South Sea Bubble in 1720-analyzed in detail here-and frequent wars caused banks to call in loans, leading to sharply slower economic growth rate. Wartime borrowing crowdedout investment. Far from fostering economic development, England's financial revolution after 1688 did much to slow it down-the Hanoverian " was a key reason for slow growth during Britain's Industrial Revolution. Prometheus Shackled is a revealing new take on one of the most importanteras of financial development.
Long Description
After 1688, Britain underwent a revolution in public finance, and the cost of borrowing declined sharply. Leading scholars have argued that easier credit for the government, made possible by better property-rights protection, lead to a rapid expansion of private credit. The Industrial Revolution, according to this view, is the result of the preceding revolution in public finance. In Prometheus Shackled, prominent economic historians Peter Teminand Hans-Joachim Voth examine this hypothesis using new, detailed archival data from 18th century banks. They conclude the opposite: the financial revolution led to an explosion of public debt, but it stifled private credit. This led to markedly slower growth in the English economy. Temin and Vothcollected detailed data from several goldsmith banks-Child's, Gosling's, Freame and Gould, Hoare's, and Duncombe and Kent. The excellent records from Hoare's, founded by Sir Richard Hoare in 1672, offer particular insight.Numerous entrants into the banking business tried their hand at deposit-taking and lending in the early 17th century; few survived and fewer thrived. Hoare's and a small group of competitors did both. Temin and Voth chart the growth of the successfulbanks in the face of frequent wars and heavy-handed regulations. Their new data allows insights into the interaction between financial and economic development. Government regulations such as (a sharply lower) maximum interest rate caused severe misallocation of credit, and a misguided attempt to lightenthe nation's debt burden led directly to the South Sea Bubble in 1720. Frequent wars caused banks to call in loans, resulting in a sharply slower economic growth rate. Based on detailed micro-data, the authors present conclusive evidence that wartime borrowing crowded out investment. Far from fostering economic development, England's financial revolution after 1688 did much to stifle it -- the Hanoverian "warfare state" was a key reason for slow growth during Britain's Industrial Revolution.Prometheus Shackled is a revealing new take on one of the most important periods of economic and financial development.
Main Description
After 1688, Britain underwent a revolution in public finance, and the cost of borrowing declined sharply. Leading scholars have argued that easier credit for the government, made possible by better property-rights protection, lead to a rapid expansion of private credit, and see the Industrial Revolution as a result of the preceding revolution in public finance. InPrometheus Shackled, prominent economic historians Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth examine this hypothesis using new, detailed archival data from 18th century banks. They conclude the opposite: the financial revolution led to an explosion of public debt, but it stifled private credit. This resulted in markedly slower growth in the English economy. Temin and Voth collected detailed data from several goldsmith banks-Child's, Gosling's, Freame and Gould, Hoare's, and Duncome and Kent. The authors look closely at Hoare's, founded by Sir Richard Hoare in 1672, because of its excellent records. Numerous entrants tried their hand at the new business of deposit banking; few survived and fewer thrived. Hoare's and a small group of competitors did both. Temin and Voth chart their growth in the face frequent wars and heavy-handed regulations. This new data allows insights into the interaction between financial and economic development. Government regulations such as setting a maximum interest rate caused severe misallocation of credit; a misguided attempt to lighten the nation's debt burden led directly to the South Sea Bubble in 1720--analyzed in detail here--and frequent wars caused banks to call in loans, leading to sharply slower economic growth rate. Wartime borrowing crowded out investment. Far from fostering economic development, England's financial revolution after 1688 did much to slow it down-the Hanoverian "warfare state" was a key reason for slow growth during Britain's Industrial Revolution.Prometheus Shackledis a revealing new take on one of the most important eras of financial development.
Main Description
After 1688, Britain underwent a revolution in public finance, and the cost of borrowing declined sharply. Leading scholars have argued that easier credit for the government, made possible by better property-rights protection, lead to a rapid expansion of private credit, and see the IndustrialRevolution as a result of the preceding revolution in public finance. In Prometheus Shackled, prominent economic historians Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth examine this hypothesis using new, detailed archival data from 18th century banks. They conclude the opposite: the financial revolution led to an explosion of public debt, but it stifled private credit. Thisresulted in markedly slower growth in the English economy. Temin and Voth collected detailed data from several goldsmith banks - Child's, Gosling's, Freame and Gould, Hoare's, and Duncome and Kent. The authors look closely at Hoare's, founded by Sir Richard Hoare in 1672, because of its excellent records. Numerous entrants tried their hand at the new business of deposit banking; few survived and fewer thrived. Hoare's and a small group of competitors did both. Temin and Voth chart their growthin the face frequent wars and heavy-handed regulations. This new data allows insights into the interaction between financial and economic development. Government regulations such as setting a maximum interest rate caused severe misallocation of credit; a misguided attempt to lighten the nation'sdebt burden led directly to the South Sea Bubble in 1720 - analyzed in detail here - and frequent wars caused banks to call in loans, leading to sharply slower economic growth rate. Wartime borrowing crowded out investment. Far from fostering economic development, England's financial revolutionafter 1688 did much to slow it down - the Hanoverian "warfare state" was a key reason for slow growth during Britain's Industrial Revolution. Prometheus Shackled is a revealing new take on one of the most important eras of financial development.
Main Description
After 1688, Britain underwent a revolution in public finance, and the cost of borrowing declined sharply. Leading scholars have argued that easier credit for the government, made possible by better property-rights protection, lead to a rapid expansion of private credit. The Industrial Revolution, according to this view, is the result of the preceding revolution in public finance. In Prometheus Shackled, prominent economic historians Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth examine this hypothesis using new, detailed archival data from 18th century banks. They conclude the opposite: the financial revolution led to an explosion of public debt, but it stifled private credit. This led to markedly slower growth in the English economy. Temin and Voth collected detailed data from several goldsmith banks-Child's, Gosling's, Freame and Gould, Hoare's, and Duncombe and Kent. The excellent records from Hoare's, founded by Sir Richard Hoare in 1672, offer particular insight. Numerous entrants into the banking business tried their hand at deposit-taking and lending in the early 17th century; few survived and fewer thrived. Hoare's and a small group of competitors did both. Temin and Voth chart the growth of the successful banks in the face of frequent wars and heavy-handed regulations. Their new data allows insights into the interaction between financial and economic development. Government regulations such as (a sharply lower) maximum interest rate caused severe misallocation of credit, and a misguided attempt to lighten the nation's debt burden led directly to the South Sea Bubble in 1720. Frequent wars caused banks to call in loans, resulting in a sharply slower economic growth rate. Based on detailed micro-data, the authors present conclusive evidence that wartime borrowing crowded out investment. Far from fostering economic development, England's financial revolution after 1688 did much to stifle it -- the Hanoverian "warfare state" was a key reason for slow growth during Britain's Industrial Revolution. Prometheus Shackled is a revealing new take on one of the most important periods of economic and financial development.
Table of Contents
Prefacep. vii
Introductionp. 3
Earning and Spending in Eighteenth-Century Londonp. 7
The Financial Revolutionp. 23
Goldsmith Banksp. 39
Borrowers, Investors, and Usury Lawsp. 73
The South Sea Bubblep. 95
The Triumph of Boring Bankingp. 125
Finance and Slow Growth during the Industrial Revolutionp. 148
Conclusionsp. 176
Notesp. 187
Referencesp. 192
Indexp. 203
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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