Catalogue


Rationalizing parliament [electronic resource] : legislative institutions and party politics in France /
John D. Huber.
imprint
Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996.
description
xii, 215 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
ISBN
0521562910
format(s)
Book
More Details
imprint
Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996.
isbn
0521562910
restrictions
Licensed for access by U. of T. users.
catalogue key
8371615
 
Includes bibliographical references (p. 197-207) and index.
A Look Inside
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 1997-06:
How do formal institutional rules affect politicians' actions? This addition to Cambridge's "Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions" series assesses the impact of two "restrictive procedures" in France's Fifth Republic constitution: the package vote (Art. 44.3) and the confidence vote (Art. 49.3). Designed to enhance executive power, these measures, according to most observers, have indeed "rationalized" an unstable parliament but at the cost of democracy. Huber argues that restrictive procedures are rarely used by the government to squelch parliamentary resistance; rather, they facilitate internal agreements among members of the majority party and among parties in coalition. Specifically, the package vote allows the government to preserve policy bargains struck by party leaders outside parliament, while the confidence vote permits parties supporting the government to compete for votes while cooperating to pass legislation. This argument contributes to debates on parliamentary politics by exploring bargaining processes within parliament itself (versus the usual focus on executive-legislative relations) and by stressing how formal rules affect behavior (versus conventional approaches emphasizing politicians' ideological beliefs, role perceptions, and policy preferences). Clearly and accessibly written for specialists in legislative behavior. W. R. Smith; Lake Forest College
Reviews
Review Quotes
Review of the hardback: 'The argument is clear and well presented ... and well referenced. This short work is a good text for courses on political institutions and comparative politics, as well as French politics.' John Gaffney, Political Studies
'The argument is clear and well presented ... and well referenced. This short work is a good text for courses on political institutions and comparative politics, as well as French politics.'John Gaffney, Political Studies
‘The argument is clear and well presented … and well referenced. This short work is a good text for courses on political institutions and comparative politics, as well as French politics.’John Gaffney, Political Studies
'The argument is clear and well presented ... and well referenced. This short work is a good text for courses on political institutions and comparative politics, as well as French politics.' John Gaffney, Political Studies
"Students (at least in the upper levels) and specialists will profit from its lucid style and original thesis." Robert Ladrech, Perspectives on Political Science
"...admirable testimony to the power of neo-institutional rational choice models to clarify central procedures in parliamentary systems. John Huber's Rationalizing Parliament is an intriguing study of the effects of institutional change on democratic governance." Kaare Strøm, Legislative Studies Quarterly
"...admirable testimony to the power of neo-institutional rational choice models to clarify central procedures in parliamentary systems. John Huber's Rationalizing Parliament is an intriguing study of the effects of institutional change on democratic governance." Kaare Strom, Legislative Studies Quarterly
"Clearly and accessibly written for specialists in legislative behavior." W.R. Smith, Choice
"Huber's analysis of confidence votes in parliamentary democracies is important and original....his award-winning book will greatly influence future scholarship on European legislative institutions." Kaare Strom, Legislative Studies Quarterly
This item was reviewed in:
Choice, June 1997
To find out how to look for other reviews, please see our guides to finding book reviews in the Sciences or Social Sciences and Humanities.
Summaries
Main Description
Rationalizing Parliament examines how institutional arrangements in the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of political parties. Professor Huber investigates the decision by French elites to include in the Constitution legislative procedures intended to "rationalize" the policy-making role of parliament and analyzes the impact of these procedures on policy outcomes, cabinet stability, and political accountability. Through its use of theories developed in the American politics literature, the study reveals important similarities between legislative politics in the United States and in parliamentary systems and the shortcomings in conventional interpretations of French institutional arrangements.
Main Description
Rationalizing Parliament examines how institutional arrangements in the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of political parties. The book investigates the decision by French cities to include in the Constitution legislative procedures aimed to 'rationalize' the policy-making role of parliament and analyses the impact of these procedures on policy outcomes, cabinet stability and political accountability. Drawing on diverse methodological approaches, including formal models, multivariate statistics, historical analysis and qualitative case studies, Professor Huber contributes to general theoretical debates about the endogenous choice of institutions, and about the exogenous impact of institutional arrangements on political decision-making. Through its use of theories developed in the American politics literature, the study reveals important similarities between legislative politics in the United States and in parliamentary systems and shortcomings in conventional interpretations of French institutional arrangements.
Description for Library
Rationalizing Parliament examines how institutional arrangements in the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of political parties. Professor Huber investigates the decision by French cities to include in the Constitution legislative procedures aimed to 'rationalise' the policy-making role of parliament and analyses the impact of these procedures on policy outcomes, cabinet stability, and political accountability. Through its use of theories developed in the American politics literature, the study reveals important similarities between legislative politics in the United States and in parliamentary systems and shortcomings in conventional interpretations of French institutional arrangements.
Description for Bookstore
Rationalizing Parliament examines how institutional arrangements in the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of political parties. Professor Huber investigates the decision by French elites to include in the Constitution legislative procedures aimed to "rationalize" the policy-making role of parliament and analyzes the impact of these procedures on policy outcomes, cabinet stability, and political accountability. Through its use of theories developed in the American politics literature, the study reveals important similarities between legislative politics in the United States and in parliamentary systems and shortcomings in conventional interpretations of French institutional arrangements.
Description for Bookstore
Rationalizing Parliament examines how institutional arrangements in the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of political parties. Professor Huber investigates the decision by French cities to include in the Constitution legislative procedures aimed to 'rationalize' the policy-making role of parliament and analyses the impact of these procedures on policy outcomes, cabinet stability and political accountability.
Bowker Data Service Summary
In 'Rationalizing Parliament', John Huber examines how institutional arrangements in the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of the country's political parties.
Description for Bookstore
Rationalizing Parliament examines how institutional arrangements in the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of political parties. Professor Huber investigates the decision by French cities to include in the Constitution legislative procedures aimed to 'rationalise' the policy-making role of parliament and analyses the impact of these procedures on policy outcomes, cabinet stability, and political accountability.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Parliamentary government in the Fifth Republic
Choosing institutions
Restrictive procedures and policy conflict
Restrictive procedures and bargaining among parties
The confidence vote procedure and electoral politics
Electoral politics, procedural choice, and the French budget
Institutional arrangements, political parties, and parliamentary democracy
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

This information is provided by a service that aggregates data from review sources and other sources that are often consulted by libraries, and readers. The University does not edit this information and merely includes it as a convenience for users. It does not warrant that reviews are accurate. As with any review users should approach reviews critically and where deemed necessary should consult multiple review sources. Any concerns or questions about particular reviews should be directed to the reviewer and/or publisher.

  link to old catalogue

Report a problem