Catalogue


Auctions in the electricity market [electronic resource] : bidding when production capacity is constrained /
Stefan Schöne.
imprint
Berlin ; Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag, 2009.
description
xiii, 412 p.
ISBN
9783540853640
format(s)
Book
More Details
added author
imprint
Berlin ; Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag, 2009.
isbn
9783540853640
restrictions
Licensed for access by U. of T. users.
catalogue key
7840671
A Look Inside
Summaries
Main Description
Electricity is an essential commodity traded at power exchanges. Its price is very volatile within a day and over the year. This raises questions about the efficiency of the trading rules.
Back Cover Copy
Electricity is an essential commodity traded at power exchanges. Its price is very volatile within a day and over the year. This raises questions about the efficiency of the trading rules. The author develops a non-cooperative auction model analyzing the bidding behavior of producers at power exchanges. Producers are limited by the production capacity of their power plants. Production costs are affiliated. This allows for independence or positive correlation. The author analyzes and compares a uniform-price, a discriminatory, and a generalized second-price auction. Optimal bids, cost efficiency, profits, and consumer prices are examined. A simple probability density function of affiliated production costs is given and used for examples. Numerical results are presented. The results of the analysis can help improving the bidding strategies of producers, selecting the best auction type at power exchanges or detecting price manipulations.
Table of Contents
Introductionp. 1
Literature Reviewp. 7
Auctions in Electricity Marketsp. 7
England and Wales: The Reference Marketp. 9
The Supply-Function Approachp. 12
Literature Based on von der Fehr/Harbord (1993)p. 15
Related Literature on Auctionsp. 18
Modelp. 21
Assumptionsp. 21
Definitionsp. 27
Preliminariesp. 28
Examplep. 32
Resultsp. 41
Demand Rangesp. 41
Costs and Efficiencyp. 42
Discriminatory Auctionp. 54
Case A: A Single Generator Serves the Demandp. 54
Case B: Both Generators Are Necessaryp. 83<
Case C: Full Market Capacity Utilizationp. 106
Uniform-Price Auctionp. 109
Case A: A Single Generator Serves the Demandp. 109
Case B: Both Generators Are Necessaryp. 114
Case C: Full Market Capacity Utilizationp. 154
Generalized Second-Price Auctionp. 156
Case A: Competitionp. 156
Case B: Full Market Capacity Utilizationp. 181
Comparisonp. 183
Case A: A Single Generator Serves the Demandp. 183
Case B: Both Generators Are Necessaryp. 190
Case C: Full Market Capacity Utilizationp. 202
Conclusionp. 205
Referencesp. 209
Indexp. 213
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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