Catalogue


What caused the financial crisis /
edited by Jeffrey Friedman.
imprint
Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, c2011.
description
ix, 360 p.
ISBN
0812221184 (paper), 9780812221183 (paper)
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
added author
imprint
Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, c2011.
isbn
0812221184 (paper)
9780812221183 (paper)
contents note
Capitalism and the crisis : bankers, bonuses, ideology, and ignorance / Jeffrey Friedman -- An accident waiting to happen : securities regulation and financial deregulation / Amar Bhid -- Monetary policy, credit extension, and housing bubbles : 2008 and 1929 / Steven Gjerstad and Vernon L. Smith -- The anatomy of a murder : who killed the American economy? / Joseph E. Stiglitz -- Monetary policy, economic policy, and the financial crisis : an empirical analysis of what went wrong / John B. Taylor -- Housing initiatives and other policy factors / Peter J. Wallison -- How securitization concentrated risk in the financial sector / Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson -- A regulated meltdown : the Basel rules and banks' leverage / Juliusz Jablecki and Mateusz Machaj -- The credit-rating agencies and the subprime debacle / Lawrence J. White -- Credit-default swaps and the crisis / Peter J. Wallison -- The crisis of 2008 : lessons for and from economics / Daron Acemoglu -- The financial crisis and the systemic failure of the economics profession / David Colander ... [et al.] -- Afterword : the causes of the financial crisis / Richard A. Posner.
catalogue key
7392452
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
About the Author
Author Affiliation
Jeffrey Friedman is a visiting scholar in the Department of Government at the University of Texas, Austin and Max Weber Senior Fellow at the Institute for Advancement of the Social Sciences, Boston University. He is the editor of Critical Review.
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 2011-08-01:
The number of answers to the question posed by the title of this book is roughly equal to the number of scholars who contributed to this informative but hardly pathbreaking volume. After all, a whole literature on the 2007-09 financial crisis, seeking to unearth the cause of this rare event, has emerged in the past few years. Indeed, many of the contributors included here merely repeat the analysis they have written elsewhere. Contributors include Joseph E. Stiglitz, Peter J. Wallison, John B. Taylor, Lawrence J. White, Daron Acemoglu, and Richard Posner, who wrote the afterword. That no consensus has yet emerged (if it ever will) is hardly surprising. The two chapters that castigate the economics profession for providing the intellectual framework that inhibited sound preventative economic policy are perhaps less well known, but no less controversial. The 66-page introductory chapter by editor Friedman (visiting scholar, Univ. of Texas, Austin) will give the interested reader an excellent sense of the rest of the book. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above. J. Prager New York University
Reviews
Review Quotes
"You will find in this collection some of the best efforts so far to understand the financial crisis."-Edmund Phelps, Columbia University
This item was reviewed in:
Choice, August 2011
To find out how to look for other reviews, please see our guides to finding book reviews in the Sciences or Social Sciences and Humanities.
Summaries
Main Description
The deflation of the subprime mortgage bubble in 2006-7 is widely agreed to have been the immediate cause of the collapse of the financial sector in 2008. Consequently, one might think that uncovering the origins of subprime lending would make the root causes of the crisis obvious. That is essentially where public debate about the causes of the crisis began-and ended-in the month following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the 502-point fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in mid-September 2008. However, the subprime housing bubble is just one piece of the puzzle. Asset bubbles inflate and burst frequently, but severe worldwide recessions are rare. What was different this time? InWhat Caused the Financial Crisisleading economists and scholars delve into the major causes of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression and, together, present a comprehensive picture of the factors that led to it. One essay examines the role of government regulation in expanding home ownership through mortgage subsidies for impoverished borrowers, encouraging the subprime housing bubble. Another explores how banks were able to securitize mortgages by manipulating criteria used for bond ratings. How this led to inaccurate risk assessments that could not be covered by sufficient capital reserves mandated under the Basel accords is made clear in a third essay. Other essays identify monetary policy in the United States and Europe, corporate pay structures, credit-default swaps, banks' leverage, and financial deregulation as possible causes of the crisis. With contributions from Richard A. Posner, Vernon L. Smith, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and John B. Taylor, among others,What Caused the Financial Crisisprovides a cogent, comprehensive, and credible explanation of why the crisis happened. It will be an essential resource for scholars and students of finance, economics, history, law, political science, and sociology, as well as others interested in the financial crisis and the nature of modern capitalism and regulation.
Main Description
The deflation of the subprime mortgage bubble in 2006-7 is widely agreed to have been the immediate cause of the collapse of the financial sector in 2008. Consequently, one might think that uncovering the origins of subprime lending would make the root causes of the crisis obvious. That is essentially where public debate about the causes of the crisis began-and ended-in the month following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the 502-point fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in mid-September 2008. However, the subprime housing bubble is just one piece of the puzzle. Asset bubbles inflate and burst frequently, but severe worldwide recessions are rare. What was different this time? In What Caused the Financial Crisisleading economists and scholars delve into the major causes of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression and, together, present a comprehensive picture of the factors that led to it. One essay examines the role of government regulation in expanding home ownership through mortgage subsidies for impoverished borrowers, encouraging the subprime housing bubble. Another explores how banks were able to securitize mortgages by manipulating criteria used for bond ratings. How this led to inaccurate risk assessments that could not be covered by sufficient capital reserves mandated under the Basel accords is made clear in a third essay. Other essays identify monetary policy in the United States and Europe, corporate pay structures, credit-default swaps, banks' leverage, and financial deregulation as possible causes of the crisis. With contributions from Richard A. Posner, Vernon L. Smith, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and John B. Taylor, among others, What Caused the Financial Crisisprovides a cogent, comprehensive, and credible explanation of why the crisis happened. It will be an essential resource for scholars and students of finance, economics, history, law, political science, and sociology, as well as others interested in the financial crisis and the nature of modern capitalism and regulation.
Bowker Data Service Summary
In this work leading economists and scholars delve into the major causes of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression and, together, present a comprehensive picture of the factors that led to it.
Table of Contents
List of Illustrationsp. vii
Capitalism and the Crisis: Bankers, Bonuses, Ideology, and Ignorancep. 1
The Crisis in Historical Perspective
An Accident Waiting to Happen: Securities Regulation and Financial Deregulationp. 69
Monetary Policy, Credit Extension, and Housing Bubbles, 2008 and 1929p. 107
What Went Wrong (and What Didn't)?
The Anatomy of a Murder: Who Killed the American Economy?p. 139
Monetary Policy, Economic Policy, and the Financial Crisis: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrongp. 150
Housing Initiatives and Other Policy Factorsp. 172
How Securitization Concentrated Risk in the Financial Sectorp. 183
A Regulated Meltdown: The Basel Rules and Banks' Leveragep. 200
The Credit-Rating Agencies and the Subprime Debaclep. 228
Credit-Default Swaps and the Crisisp. 238
Economists, Economics, and the Financial Crisis
The Crisis of 2008: Lessons for and from Economicsp. 251
The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of the Economics Professionp. 262
Afterword: The Causes of the Financial Crisisp. 279
List of Abbreviations and Acronymsp. 295
Notesp. 297
Referencesp. 319
List of Contributorsp. 337
Indexp. 343
Acknowledgmentsp. 359
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

This information is provided by a service that aggregates data from review sources and other sources that are often consulted by libraries, and readers. The University does not edit this information and merely includes it as a convenience for users. It does not warrant that reviews are accurate. As with any review users should approach reviews critically and where deemed necessary should consult multiple review sources. Any concerns or questions about particular reviews should be directed to the reviewer and/or publisher.

  link to old catalogue

Report a problem