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Architects of delusion : Europe, America, and the Iraq War /
Simon Serfaty.
imprint
Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, c2008.
description
172 p. ; 24 cm.
ISBN
081224060X (hbk. : alk. paper), 9780812240603 (hbk. : alk. paper)
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
imprint
Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, c2008.
isbn
081224060X (hbk. : alk. paper)
9780812240603 (hbk. : alk. paper)
catalogue key
6327064
 
Includes bibliographical references (p. [141]-163) and index.
A Look Inside
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 2008-12-01:
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, which holds that the 2003 Gulf War was chiefly a strategic mistake by the US, Serfaty (Old Dominion Univ.) argues that the war represents a failure of collective leadership, especially by the US, Britain, Germany, and France. He claims that the transatlantic crisis precipitated by the war was a consequence not only of the delusions of George W. Bush, Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schroder, but also of the collective misperceptions and illusions of the nations they led. Although policy choices contributed to the deep political cleavages among the major powers, Serfaty uses historical analysis to show that the crisis was also rooted in fundamental cultural and historical predispositions in each of the nations. If serious transatlantic crises are to be avoided in the future, the four major powers must learn to collaborate more effectively and provide more effective collective leadership. In particular, Serfaty argues that the US and France must end their estrangement, Britain and France must foster closer diplomatic cooperation, Germany must contribute more to regional security, and the US must play a more strategic leadership role. This penetrating, perceptive study will be of special interest to students of foreign policy and national security policy. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above. M. Amstutz Wheaton College
Reviews
Review Quotes
"A masterful analysis of America and Europe: insightful, trenchant, brilliantly conceived, and elegantly written. Drawing his lessons from America's post-World War II engagement with allies in Europe, Simon Serfaty has captured with chilling precision the dilemmas and symmetries that will dominate America's and Europe's security concerns in this generation."--General Wesley Clark
"A masterful analysis of America and Europe: insightful, trenchant, brilliantly conceived, and elegantly written. Drawing his lessons from America's post-World War II engagement with allies in Europe, Simon Serfaty has captured with chilling precision the dilemmas and symmetries that will dominate America's and Europe's security concerns in this generation."--General Wesley K. Clark
"A masterful analysis of America and Europe: insightful, trenchant, brilliantly conceived, and elegantly written. Drawing his lessons from America's post-World War II engagement with allies in Europe, Simon Serfaty has captured with chilling precision the dilemmas and symmetries that will dominate America's and Europe's security concerns in this generation."-General Wesley K. Clark
"Simon Serfaty shows why America has more to fear from a weak Europe than a strong Europe. This powerful account of leadership failure in four countries explains not only how Iraq split the West but what a new set of leaders must do to repair the damage."--Joseph S. Nye, Jr., author ofSoft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics
"Simon Serfaty shows why America has more to fear from a weak Europe than a strong Europe. This powerful account of leadership failure in four countries explains not only how Iraq split the West but what a new set of leaders must do to repair the damage."-Joseph S. Nye, Jr., author of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics
"This is an impressive work of policy analysis and scholarship. Serfaty's knowledge of politics and personalities in the four capitals he considers is extensive. The interpretations of interactions among them are subtle. And there is a fine sense of historical background as well as today's global context."--Michael Brenner, University of Pittsburg
"This is an impressive work of policy analysis and scholarship. Serfaty's knowledge of politics and personalities in the four capitals he considers is extensive. The interpretations of interactions among them are subtle. And there is a fine sense of historical background as well as today's global context."--Michael Brenner, University of Pittsburgh
"This is an impressive work of policy analysis and scholarship. Serfaty's knowledge of politics and personalities in the four capitals he considers is extensive. The interpretations of interactions among them are subtle. And there is a fine sense of historical background as well as today's global context."-Michael Brenner, University of Pittsburgh
This item was reviewed in:
Choice, December 2008
To find out how to look for other reviews, please see our guides to finding book reviews in the Sciences or Social Sciences and Humanities.
Summaries
Bowker Data Service Summary
Analysing how and why the decision to wage war was endorsed by the UK and opposed by France and Germany, the author argues that the four heads of state were the victims not only of their own personal delusions but also those of the nations they led, and contends that what followed was a significant crisis in transatlantic relations.
Long Description
The commencement of war on Iraq in 2003 was met with a variety of reactions around the globe. In "Architects of Delusion," Simon Serfaty presents a historical analysis of how and why the decision to wage war was endorsed by some of America's main European allies, especially Britain, and opposed by others, especially France and Germany.Tony Blair, George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schroeder were, Serfaty argues, the architects of one of the most serious crises in postwar transatlantic relations. These four heads of state were the victims not only of their personal delusions but also those of the nations they lead. They all played the hand that their countries had dealt them--the forceful hand of a righteous America, the principled acquiescence of a faithful Britain, the determined intransigence of a quarrelsome France, and the ambiguous "new way" of a recast Germany.Serfaty's deft interweaving of the political histories and cultures of the four countries and the personalities of their leaders transcends the Europe-bashing debate sparked by the Iraq invasion. He contends that not one of these four leaders was entirely right or entirely wrong in his approach to the others or to the issues, before and during the war. For the resulting wounds to heal, though, and for the continuity of transatlantic relations, he reminds us that the United States and France must end their estrangement, France and Britain must resolve their differences, Germany must carry its weight relative to both France and Britain, and that the United States must exert the same visionary leadership for the twenty-first century that it showed during its rise to preeminence in the twentieth century.
Main Description
The commencement of war in Iraq in 2003 was met with a variety of reactions around the globe. In Architects of Delusion, Simon Serfaty presents a historical analysis of how and why the decision to wage war was endorsed by some of America's main European allies, especially Britain, and opposed by others, especially France and Germany. Tony Blair, George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schroeder were, Serfaty argues, the architects of one of the most serious crises in postwar transatlantic relations. These four heads of state were the victims not only of their personal delusions but also of those of the nations they led. They all played the hand that their countries had dealt them-the forceful hand of a righteous America, the principled acquiescence of a faithful Britain, the determined intransigence of a quarrelsome France, and the ambiguous "new way" of a recast Germany. Serfaty's deft interweaving of the political histories and cultures of the four countries and the personalities of their leaders transcends the Europe-bashing debate sparked by the Iraq invasion. He contends that not one of these four leaders was entirely right or entirely wrong in his approach to the others or to the issues, before and during the war. For the resulting wounds to heal, though, and for the continuity of transatlantic relations, he reminds us that the United States and France must end their estrangement, France and Britain must resolve their differences, Germany must carry its weight relative to both France and Britain, and the United States must exert the same visionary leadership for the twenty-first century that it showed during its rise to preeminence in the twentieth century.
Main Description
The commencement of war in Iraq in 2003 was met with a variety of reactions around the globe. InArchitects of Delusion, Simon Serfaty presents a historical analysis of how and why the decision to wage war was endorsed by some of America's main European allies, especially Britain, and opposed by others, especially France and Germany. Tony Blair, George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schroeder were, Serfaty argues, the architects of one of the most serious crises in postwar transatlantic relations. These four heads of state were the victims not only of their personal delusions but also of those of the nations they led. They all played the hand that their countries had dealt them--the forceful hand of a righteous America, the principled acquiescence of a faithful Britain, the determined intransigence of a quarrelsome France, and the ambiguous "new way" of a recast Germany. Serfaty's deft interweaving of the political histories and cultures of the four countries and the personalities of their leaders transcends the Europe-bashing debate sparked by the Iraq invasion. He contends that not one of these four leaders was entirely right or entirely wrong in his approach to the others or to the issues, before and during the war. For the resulting wounds to heal, though, and for the continuity of transatlantic relations, he reminds us that the United States and France must end their estrangement, France and Britain must resolve their differences, Germany must carry its weight relative to both France and Britain, and the United States must exert the same visionary leadership for the twenty-first century that it showed during its rise to preeminence in the twentieth century.
Main Description
The commencement of war on Iraq in 2003 was met with a variety of reactions around the globe. In Architects of Delusion, Simon Serfaty presents a historical analysis of how and why the decision to wage war was endorsed by some of America's main European allies, especially Britain, and opposed by others, especially France and Germany. Tony Blair, George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schroeder were, Serfaty argues, the architects of one of the most serious crises in postwar transatlantic relations. These four heads of state were the victims not only of their personal delusions but also those of the nations they lead. They all played the hand that their countries had dealt them--the forceful hand of a righteous America, the principled acquiescence of a faithful Britain, the determined intransigence of a quarrelsome France, and the ambiguous "new way" of a recast Germany. Serfaty's deft interweaving of the political histories and cultures of the four countries and the personalities of their leaders transcends the Europe-bashing debate sparked by the Iraq invasion. He contends that not one of these four leaders was entirely right or entirely wrong in his approach to the others or to the issues, before and during the war. For the resulting wounds to heal, though, and for the continuity of transatlantic relations, he reminds us that the United States and France must end their estrangement, France and Britain must resolve their differences, Germany must carry its weight relative to both France and Britain, and that the United States must exert the same visionary leadership for the twenty-first century that it showed during its rise to preeminence in the twentieth century.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Terms of Estrangement
Terms of Endearment
Terms of Disparagement
Terms of Entanglement
Notes
Index
Acknowledgments
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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