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Appeasement in crisis : from Munich to Prague, October 1938-March 1939 /
David Gillard.
imprint
Basingstoke [Eng.] : Palgrave, 2007.
description
viii, 221 p. ; 22 cm.
ISBN
0230500404 (cloth), 9780230500402 (cloth)
format(s)
Book
More Details
imprint
Basingstoke [Eng.] : Palgrave, 2007.
isbn
0230500404 (cloth)
9780230500402 (cloth)
catalogue key
6269125
 
Includes bibliographical references (p. 189-209) and index.
A Look Inside
About the Author
Author Affiliation
David Gillard taught in the University of Glasgow from 1955 until his retirement in 1990.
Summaries
Bowker Data Service Summary
'Appeasement in Crisis' concentrates on the six months between the deal with Hitler at Munich and the challenge to Hitler over Poland. The text uses cabinet papers to trace the changes in thinking among key ministers, officials and service chiefs in this crucial six month period.
Description for Bookstore
This book investigates how, after Munich, Chamberlain's Cabinet tried and failed to blend appeasement with deterrence.
Long Description
After Munich, the British Government expressed readiness to defend what remained of Czechoslovakia. Six months later, Hitler ignored the warning and initiated its conquest and partition; he faced only verbal condemnation. Yet, a fortnight later, Chamberlain's Cabinet tride and failed to protect Poland by a similar "guarantee." Their deliberations show how and why they had so miscalculated.
Main Description
After Munich, the British Government expressed readiness to defend what remained of Czechoslovakia. Six months later, Hitler ignored the warning and initiated its conquest and partition; he faced only verbal condemnation. Yet, a fortnight later, Chamberlain's Cabinet tride and failed to protect Poland by a similar "guarantee". Their deliberations show how and why they had so miscalculated.
Title Summary
"At Munich in September 1938, Britain and France had undertaken to arrange an international guarantee for what was left of Gzechoslovakia. In the meantime, the British Government would feel morally obliged to act as though the guarantee were already in force. The worthlessness of this moral guarantee was exposed six months later when Germany organised the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Yet fifteen days after that Britain went on to guarantee Poland, pending a negotiated treaty. This too, failed to prevent the conquest and partition of Poland six months later. Why had Chamberlain's Cabinet believed this second guarantee would be any more effective than the first? Appeasement in Crisis shows that the answer to this question lies in the recorded exchanges among a small group of ministers, officials and service chiefs between October 1938 and March 1939."--BOOK JACKET.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgmentsp. viii
Diplomacy by Guaranteep. 1
The Outlook from Whitehallp. 14
The Challenge of Barbarismp. 35
The Prospect of Warp. 56
Resolving to Resistp. 74
Continental Commitmentp. 95
The Challenge of Annexationp. 116
The Quest for Coalitionp. 137
The Guaranteeing of Polandp. 157
Diplomacy by Dramap. 178
List of Abbreviationsp. 188
Notesp. 189
Bibliographyp. 201
Indexp. 210
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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