Catalogue


Common ground : committee politics in the U.S. House of Representatives /
John Baughman.
imprint
Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2006.
description
xiii, 253 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
ISBN
0804754160 (cloth : alk. paper), 9780804754163 (cloth : alk. paper)
format(s)
Book
More Details
imprint
Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2006.
isbn
0804754160 (cloth : alk. paper)
9780804754163 (cloth : alk. paper)
catalogue key
6129683
 
Includes bibliographical references (p. [233]-245) and index.
A Look Inside
Excerpts
Flap Copy
When do committees that share jurisdiction over an issue choose to seek agreement rather than engage in a turf war? Overlapping and ambiguous turf has become endemic in Congress over the last three decades, especially on issues at the top of the national agenda like health care reform and homeland security. A common view is that this produces gridlock and conflict, and impairs not just Congress's ability to legislate, but government agencies' ability to function, as well. In Common Ground, John Baughman argues that this problem is overstated and shows that committees can and often do bargain and cooperate successfully, even on salient and contentious issues.
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 2007-03-01:
Congress is a complicated institution that defies easy explanations. Baughman (Bates College) looks at how committees in the US House of Representatives cooperate. The focus is on the circumstances that cause cooperation to arise out of conflict and turf battles, and what is gained from that cooperation. With special attention on committee interaction and the bargaining and cooperation among committees, this study stakes out a position rather different from the literature. Conventional wisdom conceives of committees as either operating in isolation and specializing, or engaging in turf warfare in order to control politically important policy issues. At the heart of this study is the Transaction Cost Theory of Committee Turf, which suggests that the more familiar committees are with one another on particular issues, the more likely cooperation becomes. This is because the cost of competing over turf is greater than the cost of cooperation. Chapters examine the growth of committee cooperation over time in the face of reforms, bargaining and cooperation in particular settings, and the role of congressional leaders in committee cooperation. ^BSumming Up: Recommended. Graduate students and faculty. Q. Kidd Christopher Newport University
Reviews
Review Quotes
"In short, Common Groundraises and answers some important normative questions about committee politics. It features insightful theorizing about inter-committee bargaining. And it marshals extensive evidence about the consequences of overlapping jurisdictional boundaries for member behavior and the content of legislation. Although the analysis is systematic and rigorous throughout, Baughman does a great job of integrating anecdotes and examples, and the book is extremely well written. It should be of value to any informed reader with an interest in the congressional legislative process."-- Political Science Quarterlyx
"In this persuasive account of the theory and practice of committee politics in the U.S. House of Representatives, Baughman demonstrates how legislators protect, expand, and negotiate about the jurisdictions of their committees. Innovative in its theoret
"In this persuasive account of the theory and practice of committee politics in the U.S. House of Representatives, Baughman demonstrates how legislators protect, expand, and negotiate about the jurisdictions of their committees. Innovative in its theoretical stance and creative in its empirical approach, Common Ground expands the frontiers of legislative research. The mix of sound hypotheses, sophisticated quantitative analysis, and sensitivity to the players' own accounts of everyday legal strategy makes this an important book for professional students of politics."Steven S. Smith, Washington University
"In short, "Common Ground" raises and answers some important normative questions about committee politics. It features insightful theorizing about inter-committee bargaining. And it marshals extensive evidence about the consequences of overlapping jurisdictional boundaries for member behavior and the content of legislation. Although the analysis is systematic and rigorous throughout, Baughman does a great job of integrating anecdotes and examples, and the book is extremely well written. It should be of value to any informed reader with an interest in the congressional legislative process."-- "Political Science Quarterly"x
"Common Ground is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the development and modern politics of policymaking in Congress." -- Forrest Maltzman
"Innovative in its theoretical stance and creative in its empirical approach, Common Ground expands the frontiers of legislative research. The mix of sound hypotheses, sophisticated quantitative analysis, and sensitivity to the players' own accounts of everyday legal strategy makes this an important book for professional students of politics." -- Steven S. Smith
"In short,Common Groundraises and answers some important normative questions about committee politics. It features insightful theorizing about inter-committee bargaining. And it marshals extensive evidence about the consequences of overlapping jurisdictional boundaries for member behavior and the content of legislation. Although the analysis is systematic and rigorous throughout, Baughman does a great job of integrating anecdotes and examples, and the book is extremely well written. It should be of value to any informed reader with an interest in the congressional legislative process."Political Science Quarterlyx
"This is a well-written and thoughtful book that challenges the current understanding of committee jurisdiction and referrals. Baughman should be commended for taking the initiative in creating a new and interesting way to analyse a question that has long interested congressional scholars."--Political Studies Review
"This is a well-written and thoughtful book that challenges the current understanding of committee jurisdiction and referrals. Baughman should be commended for taking the initiative in creating a new and interesting way to analyse a question that has long interested congressional scholars."-- Political Studies Review
"In this persuasive account of the theory and practice of committee politics in the U.S. House of Representatives, Baughman demonstrates how legislators protect, expand, and negotiate about the jurisdictions of their committees. Innovative in its theoretical stance and creative in its empirical approach,Common Groundexpands the frontiers of legislative research. The mix of sound hypotheses, sophisticated quantitative analysis, and sensitivity to the players own accounts of everyday legal strategy makes this an important book for professional students of politics."--Steven S. Smith, Washington University
"In this persuasive account of the theory and practice of committee politics in the U.S. House of Representatives, Baughman demonstrates how legislators protect, expand, and negotiate about the jurisdictions of their committees. Innovative in its theoretical stance and creative in its empirical approach, Common Groundexpands the frontiers of legislative research. The mix of sound hypotheses, sophisticated quantitative analysis, and sensitivity to the players own accounts of everyday legal strategy makes this an important book for professional students of politics."--Steven S. Smith, Washington University
" In this persuasive account of the theory and practice of committee politics in the U.S. House of Representatives, Baughman demonstrates how legislators protect, expand, and negotiate about the jurisdictions of their committees. Innovative in its theoretical stance and creative in its empirical approach, "Common Ground" expands the frontiers of legislative research. The mix of sound hypotheses, sophisticated quantitative analysis, and sensitivity to the players' own accounts of everyday legal strategy makes this an important book for professional students of politics." -- Steven S. Smith, Washington University
"In short,Common Groundraises and answers some important normative questions about committee politics. It features insightful theorizing about inter-committee bargaining. And it marshals extensive evidence about the consequences of overlapping jurisdictional boundaries for member behavior and the content of legislation. Although the analysis is systematic and rigorous throughout, Baughman does a great job of integrating anecdotes and examples, and the book is extremely well written. It should be of value to any informed reader with an interest in the congressional legislative process."--Political Science Quarterlyx
"Common Groundargues that transaction costs endemic to legislative politics encourage congressional committees to cooperate, rather than compete. Baughman provides a theoretically informed challenge to the conventional wisdom, and offers rigorous empirical tests in support.Common Groundis a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the development and modern politics of policymaking in Congress."--Forrest Maltzman, George Washington University
" Common Ground argues that transaction costs endemic to legislative politics encourage congressional committees to cooperate, rather than compete. Baughman provides a theoretically informed challenge to the conventional wisdom, and offers rigorous empirical tests in support. Common Ground is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the development and modern politics of policymaking in Congress." -- Forrest Maltzman, George Washington University
"...a strong work that will be cited in the literature for many years to come."APSA Legislative Studies Section Newsletter
., ."a strong work that will be cited in the literature for many years to come."--"APSA Legislative Studies Section Newsletter"
"...a strong work that will be cited in the literature for many years to come."-- APSA Legislative Studies Section Newsletter
"...a strong work that will be cited in the literature for many years to come."--APSA Legislative Studies Section Newsletter
" Common Groundargues that transaction costs endemic to legislative politics encourage congressional committees to cooperate, rather than compete. Baughman provides a theoretically informed challenge to the conventional wisdom, and offers rigorous
"Common Groundargues that transaction costs endemic to legislative politics encourage congressional committees to cooperate, rather than compete. Baughman provides a theoretically informed challenge to the conventional wisdom, and offers rigorous empirical tests in support.Common Groundis a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the development and modern politics of policymaking in Congress."Forrest Maltzman, George Washington University
" "Common Ground" argues that transaction costs endemic to legislative politics encourage congressional committees to cooperate, rather than compete. Baughman provides a theoretically informed challenge to the conventional wisdom, and offers rigorous empirical tests in support. "Common Ground" is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the development and modern politics of policymaking in Congress." -- Forrest Maltzman, George Washington University
""Common Ground" argues that transaction costs endemic to legislative politics encourage congressional committees to cooperate, rather than compete. Baughman provides a theoretically informed challenge to the conventional wisdom, and offers rigorous empirical tests in support. "Common Ground" is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the development and modern politics of policymaking in Congress."--Forrest Maltzman, George Washington University
" Common Groundargues that transaction costs endemic to legislative politics encourage congressional committees to cooperate, rather than compete. Baughman provides a theoretically informed challenge to the conventional wisdom, and offers rigorous empirical tests in support. Common Groundis a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the development and modern politics of policymaking in Congress."--Forrest Maltzman, George Washington University
This item was reviewed in:
Reference & Research Book News, August 2006
Choice, March 2007
To find out how to look for other reviews, please see our guides to finding book reviews in the Sciences or Social Sciences and Humanities.
Summaries
Back Cover Copy
"Common Ground argues that transaction costs endemic to legislative politics encourage congressional committees to cooperate, rather than compete. Baughman provides a theoretically informed challenge to the conventional wisdom, and offers rigorous empirical tests in support. Common Ground is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the development and modern politics of policymaking in Congress."Forrest Maltzman, George Washington University "In this persuasive account of the theory and practice of committee politics in the U.S. House of Representatives, Baughman demonstrates how legislators protect, expand, and negotiate about the jurisdictions of their committees. Innovative in its theoretical stance and creative in its empirical approach, Common Ground expands the frontiers of legislative research. The mix of sound hypotheses, sophisticated quantitative analysis, and sensitivity to the players' own accounts of everyday legal strategy makes this an important book for professional students of politics."Steven S. Smith, Washington University
Back Cover Copy
"Common Ground argues that transaction costs endemic to legislative politics encourage congressional committees to cooperate, rather than compete. Baughman provides a theoretically informed challenge to the conventional wisdom, and offers rigorous empirical tests in support. Common Ground is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the development and modern politics of policymaking in Congress."--Forrest Maltzman, George Washington University "In this persuasive account of the theory and practice of committee politics in the U.S. House of Representatives, Baughman demonstrates how legislators protect, expand, and negotiate about the jurisdictions of their committees. Innovative in its theoretical stance and creative in its empirical approach, Common Ground expands the frontiers of legislative research. The mix of sound hypotheses, sophisticated quantitative analysis, and sensitivity to the players' own accounts of everyday legal strategy makes this an important book for professional students of politics."--Steven S. Smith, Washington University
Long Description
When do committees that share jurisdiction over an issue choose to seek agreement rather than engage in a turf war? Overlapping and ambiguous turf has become endemic in Congress over the last three decades, especially on issues at the top of the national agenda like health care reform and homeland security. A common view is that this produces gridlock and conflict, and impairs not just Congress's ability to legislate, but government agencies' ability to function, as well. In "Common Ground", John Baughman argues that this problem is overstated and shows that committees can and often do bargain and cooperate successfully, even on salient and contentious issues.
Main Description
When do committees that share jurisdiction over an issue choose to seek agreement rather than engage in a turf war? Overlapping and ambiguous turf has become endemic in Congress over the last three decades, especially on issues at the top of the national agenda like health care reform and homeland security. A common view is that this produces gridlock and conflict, and impairs not just Congress's ability to legislate, but government agencies' ability to function, as well. InCommon Ground, John Baughman argues that this problem is overstated and shows that committees can and often do bargain and cooperate successfully, even on salient and contentious issues.
Table of Contents
Tablesp. viii
Figuresp. x
Acknowledgmentsp. xi
Introductionp. 1
Committee Interaction in the Contemporary Housep. 7
A Transaction Cost Theory of Committee Turfp. 31
The Growth of Committee Interactionp. 52
Reciprocity Among Committeesp. 79
Coalition Building Among Committeesp. 102
The Structure of Committee Interactionp. 122
When Leaders Step Inp. 147
Assessing Committee Interactionp. 175
Data Sources and Measurementp. 193
Estimating Jurisdictional Proximityp. 200
Notesp. 211
Bibliographyp. 233
Indexp. 247
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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