Catalogue

COVID-19: Updates on library services and operations.

The politics and strategy of clandestine war : Special Operation Executive, 1940-1946 /
edited by Neville Wylie.
imprint
Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2007.
description
viii, 214 p.
ISBN
0415391105 (hardback)
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
added author
imprint
Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2007.
isbn
0415391105 (hardback)
catalogue key
6027773
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
Reviews
This item was reviewed in:
Reference & Research Book News, February 2007
To find out how to look for other reviews, please see our guides to finding book reviews in the Sciences or Social Sciences and Humanities.
Summaries
Back Cover Copy
This collection of new essays on the Special Operations Executive (SOE) sets out to explore the '¬~non-military' aspects of British special operations in World War II. SOE was established in summer 1940 to '¬~set Europe ablaze', by detonating popular resistance against Axis rule and nurturing '¬~secret armies'. Based on original archival research, these essays highlight for the first time the numerous other areas in which SOE contributed to the war effort and show that it played a major role in supporting Britain's political, economic, financial and humanitarian interests globally. By situating SOE within the context of Britain's broader political needs, these essays also demonstrate the extent to which SOE came to epitomise the skills found in today's secret service organisations. SOE showed itself capable of operating on a global scale and developing the necessary expertise, equipment and personnel to conduct activities across the whole spectrum of what we have come to know as '¬~covert operations'. By bringing SOE's activities into sharper focus and exposing the scale of its involvement in Britain's wartime external relations, this book echoes current thinking on the place of so-called '¬~secret world' in international politics. This book will be of much interest to students of SOE, intelligence studies, World War II and military history in general. Neville Wylie is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Nottingham. His most recent publications include Britain, Switzerland and the Second World War (2003) and European Neutrals and Non-belligerents during the Second World War (2002).
Back Cover Copy
This fascinating new collection of essays on Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) explores the '¬~non-military' aspects of British special operations in the Second World War. It details how SOE was established in the summer of 1940 to '¬~set Europe ablaze', as Churchill memorably put it. This was a task it was meant to achieve by detonating popular resistance against Axis rule, and nurturing '¬~secret armies', which might be capable of providing military and other forms of assistance for British forces when they were once again able to return to the offensive and conduct land operations in Europe. The importance of the collection, however, goes beyond merely illuminating aspects of SOE's work which have largely been overlooked in previous scholarship. More significantly, by situating SOE within the context of Britain's broader political needs, the essays demonstrate the extent to which SOE came to epitomise and embody the range of skills that are found in today's secret service organisations. SOE showed itself capable of operating on a global scale and developing the necessary expertise, equipment and personnel to conduct activities across the whole spectrum of what we have come to know as '¬~covert operations'. By bringing SOE's activities into sharper focus and exposing the scale of its involvement in Britain's wartime external relations, the essays echo current thinking on the place of the so-called '¬~secret world' in international politics.
Bowker Data Service Summary
This collection of essays explores the non-military aspects of Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) during the Second World War. It illuminates aspects of SOE's work which have been largely overlooked and demonstrates the extent to which it came to epitomise the range of skills that are found in today's secret service.
Long Description
This collection of essays on Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) sets out to meet two discrete objectives. The first is to explore the "non-military" aspects of British "special operations" over the course of the Second World War. SOE was established in the summer of 1940 to "set Europe ablaze," as Churchill memorably put it. This was a task it was meant to achieve by detonating popular resistance against Axis rule, and nurturing "secret armies," which might be capable of providing military and other forms of assistance for British forces when they were once again able to return to the offensive and conduct land operations in Europe. Naturally, most writing on SOE reflects these early priorities and devotes its attention to assessing SOE's contribution to Britain's military effort. Fostering resistance movements in enemy occupied territory was, however, only one aspect of SOE's war. The primary objective of the essays collected in this volume is to highlight the numerous other areas in which SOE was able to contribute to Britain's war effort. As these essays show, SOE played a major role in supporting Britain's political, economic, financial and humanitarian interests, in Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific theatres The importance of the collection, however, goes beyond merely illuminating aspects of SOE's work which have largely been overlooked in previous scholarship. More significantly, by situating SOE within the context of Britain's broader political needs, the essays demonstrate the extent to which SOE came to epitomize and embody the range of skills that are found in today's secret service organizations. SOE showed itself capable of operating on a global scale anddeveloping the necessary expertise, equipment and personnel to conduct activities across the whole spectrum of what we have come to know as "covert operations." By bringing SOE's activities into sharper focus and exposing the scale of its involvement in Britain's wartime external relations, the essays echo current thinking on the place of the so-called "secret world" in international politics. As they emerge from the shadows, secret agencies are increasingly being seen not as niche-market service providers but rather as forceful and at times central players in the formation of governments' foreign and security policies. SOE may have worked at the margins of Britain's military effort, but its activities were none the smaller for it, nor any less significant for the history of the Second World War.
Main Description
This collection of essays on Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) sets out to meet two discrete objectives. The first is to explore the "non-military" aspects of British "special operations" over the course of the Second World War. SOE was established in the summer of 1940 to "set Europe ablaze," as Churchill memorably put it. This was a task it was meant to achieve by detonating popular resistance against Axis rule, and nurturing "secret armies," which might be capable of providing military and other forms of assistance for British forces when they were once again able to return to the offensive and conduct land operations in Europe. Naturally, most writing on SOE reflects these early priorities and devotes its attention to assessing SOE's contribution to Britain's military effort. Fostering resistance movements in enemy occupied territory was, however, only one aspect of SOE's war. The primary objective of the essays collected in this volume is to highlight the numerous other areas in which SOE wasable to contribute to Britain's war effort. As these essays show, SOE played a major role in supporting Britain's political, economic, financial and humanitarian interests, in Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific theatres The importance of the collection, however, goes beyond merely illuminating aspects of SOE's work which have largely been overlooked in previous scholarship. More significantly, by situating SOE within the context of Britain's broader political needs, the essays demonstrate the extent to which SOE came to epitomize and embody the range of skills that are found in today's secret service organizations. SOE showed itself capable of operating on a global scale and developing the necessary expertise, equipment and personnel to conduct activities across the whole spectrum of what we have come to know as "covert operations." By bringing SOE's activities into sharper focus and exposing the scale of its involvement in Britain's wartime external relations, the essays echo current thinking on theplace of the so-called "secret world" in international politics. As they emerge from the shadows, secret agencies are increasingly being seen not as niche-market service providers but rather as forceful and at times central players in the formation of governments' foreign and security policies. SOE may have worked at the margins of Britain's military effort, but its activities were none the smaller for it, nor any less significant for the history of the Second World War.
Main Description
This fascinating new collection of essays on Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) explores the 'non-military' aspects of British special operations in the Second World War. It details how SOE was established in the summer of 1940 to 'set Europe ablaze', as Churchill memorably put it. This was a task it was meant to achieve by detonating popular resistance against Axis rule, and nurturing 'secret armies', which might be capable of providing military and other forms of assistance for British forces when they were once again able to return to the offensive and conduct land operations in Europe. The importance of the collection, however, goes beyond merely illuminating aspects of SOE's work which have largely been overlooked in previous scholarship. More significantly, by situating SOE within the context of Britain's broader political needs, the essays demonstrate the extent to which SOE came to epitomise and embody the range of skills that are found in today's secret service organisations. SOE showed itself capable of operating on a global scale and developing the necessary expertise, equipment and personnel to conduct activities across the whole spectrum of what we have come to know as 'covert operations'. By bringing SOE's activities into sharper focus and exposing the scale of its involvement in Britain's wartime external relations, the essays echo current thinking on the place of the so-called 'secret world' in international politics.
Table of Contents
Notes on contributorsp. vii
Acknowledgementsp. ix
Introduction: politics and strategy in the clandestine war - new perspectives in the study of SOEp. 1
'Of historical interest only': the origins and vicissitudes of the SOE Archivep. 15
A glass half full: some thoughts on the evolution of the study of the Special Operations Executivep. 27
The 'Massingham' mission and the secret 'special relationship': cooperation and rivalry between the Anglo-American clandestine services in French North Africa, November 1942-May 1943p. 42
Communist in SOE: explaining James Klugmann's recruitment and retentionp. 66
'Kipling and all that': American perceptions of SOE and British imperial intrigue in the Balkans, 1943-1945p. 90
Ungentlemanly warriors or unreliable diplomats? Special Operations Executive and 'irregular political activities' in Europep. 109
A succession of crises? SOE in the Middle East, 1940-1945p. 130
'Toughs and thugs': the Mazzini Society and political warfare among Italian POWs in India, 1941-1943p. 154
'Against the grain': Special Operations Executive in Spain, 1941-1945p. 177
SOE's foreign currency transactionsp. 193
Indexp. 209
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

This information is provided by a service that aggregates data from review sources and other sources that are often consulted by libraries, and readers. The University does not edit this information and merely includes it as a convenience for users. It does not warrant that reviews are accurate. As with any review users should approach reviews critically and where deemed necessary should consult multiple review sources. Any concerns or questions about particular reviews should be directed to the reviewer and/or publisher.

  link to old catalogue

Report a problem