Catalogue


The power of separation : American constitutionalism and the myth of the legislative veto /
Jessica Korn.
imprint
Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, c1996.
description
178 p. ; 25 cm.
ISBN
069102135X (cl : alk. paper)
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
imprint
Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, c1996.
isbn
069102135X (cl : alk. paper)
catalogue key
582658
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
Excerpts
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"Jessica Korn has done a masterful and convincing job of pointing out some common misconceptions about the way our Constitutional separation of powers works and what the well-known Supreme Court decision in INS v. Chadha actually accomplished."-- Derek Bok, Harvard University "In this superb study, Jessica Korn not only explodes several myths about the legislative veto, but captures many timeless truths about America's Madisonian system of governance. The story is fascinating and the news is good: American government can adapt to new challenges without weakening the separation of powers.... Scholars, journalists, students, and average citizens who care about the future of American politics ought to read this book."-- John J. DiIulio, Jr., Princeton University/Brookings Institution
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 1997-02-01:
Following the Supreme Court case INS v. Chadha (1983), in which the legislative veto was ruled an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers, analysts expressed fear that removing this weapon from Congress's arsenal would cripple it in the war against runaway bureaucracy. In this short and informative work, Korn quells these fears by demonstrating that the legislative veto was all along little more than "a solution in search of a problem" (Justice Scalia's words). Through detailed empirical analysis of its major instances, Korn shows the veto was rarely used and never effective. Its primary purpose was to symbolize Congress's intent to remain an active player in implementation, and its real effect was to limit this ability by turning Congress's attention from more effective means of intervention and control. Analysts missed the point in all this, Korn believes, because they were embedded in the Wilsonian paradigm of institutional analysis. Her excellent discussion of this--including her analysis of The Federalist papers--makes no reference to the outstanding scholar in this area, Vincent Ostrom (The Meaning of American Federalism, 1991; The Political Theory of a Compound Republic, 1987; The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, CH, Dec'73; 2nd ed., 1989). Detailed and closely reasoned, with extensive notes. Highly recommended for libraries and scholars. M. Berheide Berea College
Reviews
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One of Choice 's Outstanding Academic Titles for 1997
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Choice, February 1997
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Summaries
Main Description
Jessica Korn challenges the notion that the eighteenth-century principles underlying the American separation of powers system are incompatible with the demands of twentieth-century governance. She demostrates the continuing relevance of these principles by questioning the dominant scholarship on the legislative veto. As a short-cut through constitutional procedure invented in the 1930s and invalidated by the Supreme Court's Chadha decision in 1983, the legislative veto has long been presumed to have been a powerful mechanism of congressional oversight. Korn's analysis, however, shows that commentators have exaggerated the legislative veto's significance as a result of their incorrect assumption that the separation of powers was designed solely to check governmental authority. The Framers also designed constitutional structure to empower the new national government, institutionalizing a division of labor among the three branches in order to enhance the government's capacity. By examining the legislative vetoes governing the FTC, the Department of Education, and the president's authority to extend most-favored-nation trade status, Korn demonstrates how the powers that the Constitution grants to Congress made the legislative veto short-cut inconsequential to policymaking. These case studies also show that Chadha enhanced Congress's capacity to pass substantive laws while making it easier for Congress to preserve important discretionary powers in the executive branch. Thus, in debunking the myth of the legislative veto, Korn restores an appreciation of the enduring vitality of the American constitutional order.
Unpaid Annotation
Jessica Korn challenges the notion that the eighteenth-century principles underlying the American separation of powers system are incompatible with the demands of twentieth-century governance. She demostrates the continuing relevance of these principles by questioning the dominant scholarship on the legislative veto. As a short-cut through constitutional procedure invented in the 1930s and invalidated by the Supreme Court's Chadha decision in 1983, the legislative veto has long been presumed to have been a powerful mechanism of congressional oversight. Korn's analysis, however, shows that commentators have exaggerated the legislative veto's significance as a result of their incorrect assumption that the separation of powers was designed solely to check governmental authority. The Framers also designed constitutional structure to empower the new national government, institutionalizing a division of labor among the three branches in order to enhance the government's capacity.By examining the legislative vetoes governing the FTC, the Department of Education, and the president's authority to extend most-favored-nation trade status, Korn demonstrates how the powers that the Constitution grants to Congress made the legislative veto short-cut inconsequential to policymaking. These case studies also show that Chadha enhanced Congress's capacity to pass substantive laws while making it easier for Congress to preserve important discretionary powers in the executive branch. Thus, in debunking the myth of the legislative veto, Korn restores an appreciation of the enduring vitality of the American constitutional order.
Table of Contents
Introduction: American Constitutionalism and American Political Sciencep. 3
The American Separation of Powers Doctrinep. 14
The Legislative Vetop. 27
The Legislative Veto over the Federal Trade Commissionp. 48
Legislative Vetoes in Education Statutesp. 69
Legislative Vetoes over Presidential Authority to Extend Most-Favored-Nation Statusp. 91
Conclusionp. 116
Notesp. 125
Acknowledgmentsp. 167
Name Indexp. 171
General Indexp. 175
Table of Contents provided by Blackwell. All Rights Reserved.

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