France and the Nazi threat : the collapse of French diplomacy 1932-1939 /
Jean-Baptiste Duroselle ; introduction by Anthony Adamthwaite ; [translated by Catherine E. Dop and Robert L. Miller].
1st English-language ed.
New York : Enigma Books, 2004.
xlii, 508 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
More Details
New York : Enigma Books, 2004.
general note
"An Enigma original paperback"--Cover.
Originally published in French under the title: La Décadence, 1932-1939, 3ème édition corrigée--T.p. verso.
catalogue key
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
About the Author
Author Affiliation
Jean-Baptiste Duroselle was a full professor at the Sorbonne and at the Institut des Sciences Politiques. He was the author of many important books on world history and politics
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 2004-12-01:
Duroselle {1917-94) was a major historian of France and of 19th- and 20th-century international relations. He taught at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques and then at the Sorbonne as well as at US universities, and was author of several significant studies on, among other topics, social Catholicism, France's Belle Epoque, France during WW I, diplomatic relations from 1919 to the early 1950s, and US foreign policy from Wilson to Roosevelt, as well as a stunning biography of Clemenceau. His great reputation gave him access to French diplomatic documents for the interwar years (1919-40) and responsibility for selecting many for publication. France and the Nazi Threat, originally published in French in 1979 as La Decadence, remains a classic interpretation of the multiple failures of French diplomacy from the eve of Hitler's access to power to the defeat of France in 1940. Well informed, expertly documented, and argued with power and passion, this study has won acclaim as the standard work. Duroselle finds no heroes but some villains, especially Georges Bonnet, foreign minister at the time of the crisis over Czechoslovakia, which concluded with France's abandonment of its ally at Munich. This excellent translation is a must for undergraduate libraries. ^BSumming Up: Essential. All levels/libraries. N. Greene Wesleyan University
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Choice, December 2004
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Bowker Data Service Summary
This is an in-depth account of the French diplomatic breakdown in the face of Hitler's aggression, by France's greatest historian of foreign policy.
Main Description
A brilliant study by France's foremost historian of the period that details the reasons behind France's lack of response to Hitler's Germany during the 1930s and the slide toward war.
Main Description
A brilliant study by France’s foremost historian of the period that details the reasons behind France’s lack of response to Hitler’s Germany during the 1930s and the slide toward war.
Main Description
A Classic In-Depth Account -- Never Before Translated Into English -- by France's greatest historian of foreign policy. The most thorough analysis of the French diplomatic breakdown in the face of Hitler's aggression. Of all nations, France experienced the most spectacular fall from the pinnacle of victory in the First World War to the tragedy of Munich and defeat in 1940. The descent of a world power is chronicled in fascinating detail by the great scholar Jean-Baptiste Duroselle in his greatest work. Book jacket.
Table of Contents
Introductionp. xi
Forewordp. xxv
Prefacep. xxvii
The Return of Edouard Herriot (June-December 1932)p. 1
France and the End of Reparationsp. 4
Herriot, Disarmament and "Equal Rights"p. 8
Herriot's Positive Contribution: the Franco-Soviet Agreementp. 14
The Debts, the United States, and the Fall of Herriotp. 20
The Year of Paul-Boncour (December 18, 1932-January 30, 1934)p. 24
How Did the French React to Hitler's Coming to Power?p. 26
A Total Failure: Disarmament and the Franco-German Rapprochementp. 32
The Four Power Pact and the Outline of a Franco-Italian Rapprochementp. 38
The Pursuit of Rapprochement with the USSRp. 43
The Move Toward Economic Nationalismp. 46
The Barthou Era (1934)p. 53
Louis Barthou and His Plansp. 54
The Note of April 17, 1934p. 58
The Visit of the Smaller Alliesp. 64
Toward the Grand Alliancep. 69
French Public Opinionp. 76
The Laval Erap. 85
A Small Step Towards Germanyp. 87
A Small Step Towards Italyp. 92
A Small Step Towards the USSRp. 100
A Small Step Towards Englandp. 104
The Rhineland Tragedy (January-June 1936)p. 112
Internal and Foreign Policy up to March 7, 1936p. 113
The Forecasts About the Dimilitarized Zonep. 116
Was There a Countermove Planned?p. 122
The Decision to Not React and Getting Bogged Downp. 127
The Atmospherep. 137
The Status of French Patriotismp. 137
The French Traveled Very Little Overseasp. 141
Foreign Tourists in Francep. 144
Immigration: A Diluted Form of Foreign Influencep. 145
Foreign Countries as Seen in Literaturep. 150
The Influence of Foreign Propaganda on Public Opinionp. 157
France's Worldwide Economic Interestsp. 163
The "Gold-Bloc"p. 164
Overview of French Foreign Tradep. 171
Lingering Economic Imperialismp. 174
The Empirep. 182
Elusive Securityp. 189
The Doctrinep. 191
The Conditions of France's Armed Forces in 1936p. 196
The High Commandp. 201
The Hereticsp. 208
The Diplomatic Machinep. 214
The Quai d'Orsayp. 214
The Ambassadorsp. 220
The Specialized Attachesp. 225
The Popular Front (1936-1937)p. 233
A Timid Beginningp. 236
The Beginning of Non-Intervention in Spainp. 242
The Great Devaluation and the Lesser Onesp. 246
A Western Grand Design?p. 252
1937: A Colorless Yearp. 255
The Year of Munichp. 264
The March 1938 Crisisp. 264
The Final Reaction of the Popular Frontp. 267
The False Crisis of May 1938p. 271
Preliminaries to the Great Crisisp. 277
France Abandons Czechoslovakiap. 282
The Great Crisis and Munich (September 23-30)p. 287
French Public Opinion and Munichp. 291
The Collapse of France's Prestige Abroadp. 299
After Munich: Expectations and Uncertaintiesp. 302
Munich and the Economyp. 307
The Limits of the Franco-German Rapprochementp. 315
The Impossible Franco-Italian Rapprochementp. 322
The Ukraine or Holland?p. 328
Romania or Czechoslovakia?p. 332
The Failure of the Grand Alliance (March-August 1939)p. 336
Spain: Moral Failure and Diplmatic Successp. 337
Italy Remains Out of Reachp. 343
Toward the "Grand Alliance"--The Preliminary Negotiationsp. 346
The Political Negotiationsp. 351
The Failure of the Military Negotiationsp. 357
On the Periphery--The Near Eastp. 363
Final Preparationsp. 368
Economic Readinessp. 368
The Air Force from Munich to the Warp. 374
Battle Plansp. 384
Toward a Unified Command?p. 393
Toward the Inescapable Conclusion (August 22-September 3, 1939)p. 395
France Remains Passive (August 23-31, 1939)p. 396
The Last Three Days (September 1-3, 1939)p. 405
Glossary of terms and abbreviationsp. 416
Notesp. 417
Indexp. 498
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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