Catalogue


Balancing risks : great power intervention in the periphery /
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro.
imprint
Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 2004.
description
xviii, 304 p.
ISBN
0801442214 (alk. paper)
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
imprint
Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 2004.
isbn
0801442214 (alk. paper)
contents note
Power politics and the balance of risk -- Explaining great power involvement in the periphery -- Germany and the 1905 Morocco crisis -- Japan and the 1940-41 war decisions -- The United States and the Korean War (1950-51) -- The limits of great power intervention in the periphery.
catalogue key
5162286
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 2004-12-01:
Taliaferro (Tufts Univ.) offers a thoroughly researched and dense discourse synthesizing realism and psychological theory to analyze three important episodes of great power intervention in areas outside their security interests. The case studies explored are: German leaders during the pre-World War I crisis, Japanese leaders in 1940-41, and the Truman Administration during the Korean War. Using original archival research, the author demonstrates that leaders are most likely to choose risky options in the hope of recovering perceived relative losses in status or power. Rather than rational cost-benefit analysis, prospect theory helps explain why great powers pursue these costly and damaging interventions. The author's theoretical argument is strong, the methodology sound, and the policy implications of this book would be of use to students and practitioners alike. ^BSumming Up: Highly recommended. Upper-level undergraduates, graduate students, teachers and policymakers. E. A. Turpen Henry L. Stimson Center
Reviews
Review Quotes
"Balancing Risks marries international relations theory and psychology to produce a powerful argument that explains why great powers intervene in seemingly unimportant regions. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro makes a convincing case that it is fear of loss rather than hope for gain that drives these interventions. At a time when American intervention in the Third World again dominates the foreign policy of the United States, Taliaferro's views need to be given careful consideration both by scholars and policymakers."-Steven R. David, Professor of Political Science, Director of International Studies Program, The Johns Hopkins University
"Balancing Risks offers a cogent analysis bearing on the lessons of great powers initiating military or diplomatic interventions outside of their security interests. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro provides three theories of foreign policy to explain why great powers risk serious consequences by intervening on the periphery. The theoretical argument is strong, the case selection masterful, and the policy implications should be required reading for all students and practitioners."-Larry Berman, author of No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger and Betrayal in Vietnam
"Great powers have frequently become embroiled in costly wars in peripheral regions that pose no direct threat. . . . In this historically rich and theoretically elegant study, Taliaferro tackles the question of why states persist in such counterproductive interventions. . . . It provides a useful cautionary message as the United States embarks on far-flung counterterrorism operations in the periphery."-Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, no. 5
"Jeffrey Taliaferro's Balancing Risks is a creative synthesis of realism and psychological theory. His case studies on pre-World War I crises, Japan in 1940-41, and the Korean war combine richly detailed historical narrative with psychological insights and geopolitical observations. Through original archival research, he shows that leaders are most likely to choose risky options in a desperate attempt to recover declining prestige, status, or power. Psychological pressures overcome efforts at rational calculation of costs and benefits. Taliaferro uses prospect theory to explain a familiar paradox-foreign policy leaders who are reluctant to undertake bold foreign policy initiatives engage in costly, imprudent interventions in areas of relatively low strategic importance. His findings should be considered by U.S. policymakers who have committed vast resources to intervention in order to avert the possibility of further terrorist attacks."-Deborah Welch Larson, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles
"Taliaferro skillfully blends two lines of theorizing defensive realism and prospect theory, to explain the conditions under which leaders of great powers are more or less likely to adopt risky foreign military policies. . . . Balancing Risks is a thoroughly researched and well written addition to the literature."-Spencer D. Bakich, Virginia Quarterly Review
"Why do great powers persist in peripheral interventions? Challenging both offensive realism and domestic coalition theories, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro offers a plausible solution, arguing that prospect theory explains why great powers persist in otherwise counterproductive interventions. This book has much to recommend it: it is historically rich, methodologically well designed, and is well written."-Michael Desch, Director, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky
This item was reviewed in:
Choice, December 2004
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Summaries
Bowker Data Service Summary
Why do some powerful nations risk military & diplomatic interventions in far-off & peripheral places when the situation poses them no direct threat? Jeffrey Taliaferro constructs a theory drawing on defensive realism (international relations) & prospect theory (psychology).
Main Description
Great powers often initiate risky military and diplomatic inventions in far-off, peripheral regions that pose no direct threat to them, risking direct confrontation with rivals in strategically inconsequential places. Why do powerful countries behave in a way that leads to entrapment in prolonged, expensive, and self-defeating conflicts? Jeffrey W. Taliaferro suggests that such interventions are driven by the refusal of senior officials to accept losses in their state's relative power, international status, or prestige. Instead of cutting their losses, leaders often continue to invest blood and money in failed excursions into the periphery. Their policies may seem to be driven by rational concerns about power and security, but Taliaferro deems them to be at odds with the master explanation of political realism. Taliaferro constructs a "balance-of-risk" theory of foreign policy that draws on defensive realism (in international relations) and prospect theory (in psychology). He illustrates the power of this new theory in several case narratives: Germany's initiation and escalation of the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan crises, the United States' involvement in the Korean War in 195052, and Japan's entanglement in the second Sino-Japanese war in 193740 and its decisions for war with the U.S. in 194041.
Table of Contents
Tables and figures
Acknowledgments
Abreviations
Note on translations, romanization, and stylistic conventions
Power politics and the balance of riskp. 1
Explaining great power involvement in the peripheryp. 29
Germany and the 1905 Morocco crisisp. 55
Japan and the 1940-41 war decisionsp. 94
The United States and the Korean War (1950-51)p. 132
The limits of great power intervention in the peripheryp. 173
Implications of the argumentp. 218
Notesp. 241
Indexp. 297
Table of Contents provided by Blackwell. All Rights Reserved.

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