Catalogue


Western intelligence and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 1980-1990 : ten years that did not shake the world /
David Arbel and Ran Edelist.
imprint
London ; Portland, OR : Frank Cass, 2003.
description
xiv, 338 p. ; 24 cm.
ISBN
0714654019 (cloth)
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
author
added author
uniform title
imprint
London ; Portland, OR : Frank Cass, 2003.
isbn
0714654019 (cloth)
catalogue key
5119574
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
About the Author
Author Affiliation
David Arbel was born in Israel in 1936. He is a former high-ranking intelligence officer and carried out various HQ and field functions. He is a graduate of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and New York University where he majored in Middle Eastern Studies and Political Science Ran Edelist was born in Israel in 1943. He is a writer and freelance journalist and commentator. He was a military correspondent for Israeli television and Chief Editor of Monitin
Reviews
This item was reviewed in:
Reference & Research Book News, August 2003
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Summaries
Back Cover Copy
In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. It was an event of major historic and global dimensions, yet it took the entire world totally by suprise. In this book, the authors interview dozens of people who dealt with Soviet affairs in the 1980s, all of who admit to having been caught off guard.
Long Description
In the second half of 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. It was an event of major historic and global dimensions, yet this strategic transformation of international relations took the entire world totally by suprise - despite the fact that the West saw in the Communist power an ideological foe and a major military threat. During the 1980s Western intelligence services spent about $40 billion every year, most of it to monitor the Soviet Union and its satellites. Yet all of them, without exception, were taken by surprise when the red empire crumbled. The American CIA, Britain's MI-6, Germany's BND and the French DGSE all failed to comprehend that the Soviet Union was approaching the end of its imperial existence. A handful of honest intelligence professionals who identified the signs of weakness and distress were shunted aside. The authors of this book interviewed dozens of people who dealt with Soviet affairs in the 1980s, most of them in the United States, some in Europe, the Soviet Union and Israel. Theinterviewees included high ranking government officials, academics and journalists, but mostly intelligence personnel. All admitted having been caught off guard, but differed over the reasons for their surprise, and who was responsible for it.
Bowker Data Service Summary
During the 1980s Western intelligence services spent about $40 billion each year. They certainly proved the oxymoron to be true. The Soviet Union collapsed but no-one knew! In much the same way the World Trade Center towers were destroyed. This volume offers a scathing criticism of Western intelligence.
Table of Contents
Prefacep. vii
Surprisep. ix
Acknowledgmentsp. x
Introductionp. xi
The Threatp. 1
The Mythp. 50
Conceptual Conformityp. 117
The Great Surprisep. 176
The Writing on the Wallp. 181
Why the West Failed to See the Writing on the Wallp. 207
Politics and Intelligencep. 249
The Relevance of Strategic Intelligencep. 284
Epilogue: From Strategic Blind Spot to Operational Blunderp. 296
Glossaryp. 313
List of intervieweesp. 316
Select Bibliographyp. 319
Indexp. 326
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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