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Ethics and the future of conflict : lessons from the 1990s /
editors, Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Albert C. Pierce, Joel H. Rosenthal.
imprint
Upper Saddle River, N.J. : Pearson/Prentice Hall, c2004.
description
xiv, 192 p.
ISBN
0131839934
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
imprint
Upper Saddle River, N.J. : Pearson/Prentice Hall, c2004.
isbn
0131839934
contents note
War, strategy, and ethics / Albert C. Pierce -- The politics and ethics of rescue / John P. Langan -- Responding to terrorism : ethical implications / Martha Crenshaw -- From just war to just peace / Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond -- From moral norm to criminal code : the law of armed conflict and the restraint of contemporary warfare / James Turner Johnson -- What's living and what's dead in nuclear ethics / Steven Lee -- Living with chemical and biological weapons / Frances V. Harbour -- Technology war : moral dilemmas on the battlefield / Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. -- Slouching toward Kosovo : matching moral expectations and military capabilities in modern warfare / Conrad Crane -- Strategic theory, military practice, and the laws of war : the case of strategic bombing / Martin Cook.
catalogue key
5095310
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
Excerpts
Introduction or Preface
It is tempting to think of 1991-2001 as the "post-Cold War" decade. As such, it is a transitional period, a relatively benign time when the great powers paused before a new mortal challenge appeared. Such an interpretation is terribly mistaken. While the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans will inevitably register as relatively minor episodes in the broad sweep of American history, tectonic changes occurred in the 1990s that will be felt for years to come. All of the fault lines that look so dangerous today preceded the earthquake of September 11, 2001. The agenda for the future has been hidden in plain sight for quite some time. In geopolitical terms, the question of ethics and force is now largely about the values and goals of the United States. As the predominant military force in the world--far exceeding the capabilities of even the most advanced industrialized nations--the United States has demonstrated its willingness and capability to deliver lethal force to enforce a stable and predictable world order. The key concept for the next decade is the same as the last: asymmetry. Asymmetry--a situation in which the combined military and economic power of one state creates a radical imbalance in power--is the result of American political will as well as the fruit of American technology. Americans have made it a priority to conduct research and development in military systems ranging from precision-guided munitions to satellite intelligence-gathering and missile defense. In political terms, Americans have also signaled willingness, beyond any other nation or group of nations, to spend the resources necessary to purchase and deploy these sophisticated systems. While this willingness might be reaching new heights after September 11, again, the pattern is nothing new. One place where the pattern of the past may take a new turn is in the tendency of American planners to minimize risk to U.S. forces, to engage in force protection or riskless war. Michael Ignatieff has written about "virtual war"--war in technological superiority allows all risk to be exported to the enemy. The current war against terrorism will put stress on this notion. Hard choices will need to be made regarding risk and reward. What is it worth--in terms of U.S. casualties--to apprehend elusive terrorists? What should be done when long-range bombing is not sufficient? For the moment, Americans are clinging to the benefits of virtual war with understandable tenacity. Another place where a familiar pattern will be tested is in the strict interpretation of noncombatant status and immunity. Military operations in the 1990s--largely humanitarian in nature--featured strong emphasis on maintaining the firewall between combatants and noncombatants. Human rights advocates and ethics critics often pointed to policies such as long-range bombing, dual-use targeting, and even the use of relatively indiscriminate economic sanctions as testing the limits of noncombatant immunity. But few doubted the intent of planners to limit collateral damage as much as possible. The struggle in the future will be over defining standards for "as much as possible." What is considered an acceptable amount of collateral damage in a war of self-defense might be different, and more permissive, than a war with humanitarian goals. For all of the new stressors on our familiar pattern, the ultimate purposes for resorting to force are likely to continue unchanged. In addition to self-defense and the pursuit of human rights goals, force will be used to punish and deter. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are also likely to continue, as states will no longer be allowed to "fail." Failed states are obvious refuges for terrorists. In fighting what President George W. Bush has called the "axis of evil," there is pressure to put a face on that evil so that it ca
Introduction or Preface
It is tempting to think of 1991-2001 as the "post-Cold War" decade. As such, it is a transitional period, a relatively benign time when the great powers paused before a new mortal challenge appeared. Such an interpretation is terribly mistaken.While the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans will inevitably register as relatively minor episodes in the broad sweep of American history, tectonic changes occurred in the 1990s that will be felt for years to come. All of the fault lines that look so dangerous today preceded the earthquake of September 11, 2001. The agenda for the future has been hidden in plain sight for quite some time.In geopolitical terms, the question of ethics and force is now largely about the values and goals of the United States. As the predominant military force in the world--far exceeding the capabilities of even the most advanced industrialized nations--the United States has demonstrated its willingness and capability to deliver lethal force to enforce a stable and predictable world order. The key concept for the next decade is the same as the last: asymmetry.Asymmetry--a situation in which the combined military and economic power of one state creates a radical imbalance in power--is the result of American political will as well as the fruit of American technology. Americans have made it a priority to conduct research and development in military systems ranging from precision-guided munitions to satellite intelligence-gathering and missile defense. In political terms, Americans have also signaled willingness, beyond any other nation or group of nations, to spend the resources necessary to purchase and deploy these sophisticated systems. While this willingness might be reaching new heights after September 11, again, the pattern is nothing new.One place where the pattern of the past may take a new turn is in the tendency of American planners to minimize risk to U.S. forces, to engage in force protection or riskless war. Michael Ignatieff has written about "virtual war"--war in technological superiority allows all risk to be exported to the enemy. The current war against terrorism will put stress on this notion. Hard choices will need to be made regarding risk and reward. What is it worth--in terms of U.S. casualties--to apprehend elusive terrorists? What should be done when long-range bombing is not sufficient? For the moment, Americans are clinging to the benefits of virtual war with understandable tenacity.Another place where a familiar pattern will be tested is in the strict interpretation of noncombatant status and immunity. Military operations in the 1990s--largely humanitarian in nature--featured strong emphasis on maintaining the firewall between combatants and noncombatants. Human rights advocates and ethics critics often pointed to policies such as long-range bombing, dual-use targeting, and even the use of relatively indiscriminate economic sanctions as testing the limits of noncombatant immunity. But few doubted the intent of planners to limit collateral damage as much as possible. The struggle in the future will be over defining standards for "as much as possible." What is considered an acceptable amount of collateral damage in a war of self-defense might be different, and more permissive, than a war with humanitarian goals.For all of the new stressors on our familiar pattern, the ultimate purposes for resorting to force are likely to continue unchanged. In addition to self-defense and the pursuit of human rights goals, force will be used to punish and deter. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are also likely to continue, as states will no longer be allowed to "fail." Failed states are obvious refuges for terrorists. In fighting what President George W. Bush has called the "axis of evil," there is pressure to put a face on that evil so that it ca
Introduction or Preface
It is tempting to think of 1991-2001 as the "post-Cold War" decade. As such, it is a transitional period, a relatively benign time when the great powers paused before a new mortal challenge appeared. Such an interpretation is terribly mistaken. While the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans will inevitably register as relatively minor episodes in the broad sweep of American history, tectonic changes occurred in the 1990s that will be felt for years to come. All of the fault lines that look so dangerous today preceded the earthquake of September 11, 2001. The agenda for the future has been hidden in plain sight for quite some time. In geopolitical terms, the question of ethics and force is now largely about the values and goals of the United States. As the predominant military force in the world--far exceeding the capabilities of even the most advanced industrialized nations--the United States has demonstrated its willingness and capability to deliver lethal force to enforce a stable and predictable world order. The key concept for the next decade is the same as the last: asymmetry. Asymmetry--a situation in which the combined military and economic power of one state creates a radical imbalance in power--is the result of American political will as well as the fruit of American technology. Americans have made it a priority to conduct research and development in military systems ranging from precision-guided munitions to satellite intelligence-gathering and missile defense. In political terms, Americans have also signaled willingness, beyond any other nation or group of nations, to spend the resources necessary to purchase and deploy these sophisticated systems. While this willingness might be reaching new heights after September 11, again, the pattern is nothing new. One place where the pattern of the past may take a new turn is in the tendency of American planners to minimize risk to U.S. forces, to engage in force protection or riskless war. Michael Ignatieff has written about "virtual war"--war in technological superiority allows all risk to be exported to the enemy. The current war against terrorism will put stress on this notion. Hard choices will need to be made regarding risk and reward. What is it worth--in terms of U.S. casualties--to apprehend elusive terrorists? What should be done when long-range bombing is not sufficient? For the moment, Americans are clinging to the benefits of virtual war with understandable tenacity. Another place where a familiar pattern will be tested is in the strict interpretation of noncombatant status and immunity. Military operations in the 1990s--largely humanitarian in nature--featured strong emphasis on maintaining the firewall between combatants and noncombatants. Human rights advocates and ethics critics often pointed to policies such as long-range bombing, dual-use targeting, and even the use of relatively indiscriminate economic sanctions as testing the limits of noncombatant immunity. But few doubted the intent of planners to limit collateral damage as much as possible. The struggle in the future will be over defining standards for "as much as possible." What is considered an acceptable amount of collateral damage in a war of self-defense might be different, and more permissive, than a war with humanitarian goals. For all of the new stressors on our familiar pattern, the ultimate purposes for resorting to force are likely to continue unchanged. In addition to self-defense and the pursuit of human rights goals, force will be used to punish and deter. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are also likely to continue, as states will no longer be allowed to "fail." Failed states are obvious refuges for terrorists. In fighting what President George W. Bush has called the "axis of evil," there is pressure to put a face on that evil so that it can be eliminated. Whether that face is Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, or some other foe, we can anticipate ongoing efforts at targeting specific leaders as well as the states in which they are found. New forms of warfare are already beginning to surface, although none are without precedent. We have seen the beginning of a new phase in the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The anthrax attack of fall 2001 may be a precursor of future threats. The first response has been the creation of the Office of Homeland Defense. Whether further reform of the U.S. defense establishment is necessary to meet this threat remains to be seen. It is not hard to imagine a reassessment of the National Security Act of 1947--the act that created the current structure in anticipation of the Cold War that followed. In addition to the real threat of chemical and biological attacks, cyberwarfare lurks as yet another threat to American security. As American policymakers think about their options for defense, they will face the question of how much offense do we need to provide a good defense? Should the United States and its allies seek regime changes in places such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea? Is preemption the wave of the future? Fighting nonstate terror networks raises the question of how much responsibility can be assigned to the states where terrorism and threat to Western interests reside. Strategists are facing a world with no clearly defined defense perimeter. American hegemony raises as many questions for the ethicist as it does for the strategist. As the United States fights its wars of the next decade, it will surely follow both the law of armed conflict, and to the extent possible, evolving human rights law and the principles of the just war tradition. But clear-cut answers as to the most ethical policy choices are not likely to be available. The war against the al Qaeda terrorist network has raised controversial questions regarding nonstate actors and their status under international law. We can anticipate more such cases where the law is unclear and precedents will be set. The best assurance of an ethical foreign policy is an assurance that new policies will be openly debated--that interested citizens will test these policies against the principles and standards that American policymakers themselves profess. Taking a realist perspective, this book is premised on the idea that ethics is not always about achieving consensus on moral ideals. Sometimes the best we can do is to articulate and negotiate differences. Realists understand that the journey to "a just world" is a journey that can never be completed. But in reflecting on where we have been and where we are going, we can surely strive to do our part well. At the top of our agenda for the future should be a commitment to relate reason to experience, to test principles against tough cases, and to hold our policies up to scrutiny. In the end, this process is what ultimately will make our foreign policies as ethical as they can be. The editors would like to thank the numerous individuals who helped organize the meetings that produced these chapters, and those who helped in the editing process. At the Carnegie Council, Eva Becker, Vice President for Finance and Administration, provided assistance throughout the project. Matt Mattern and Lotta Hagman helped in planning and organizing the meetings. Janice Gabucan and Vivek Nayar helped in the editing stages. The editors would also like to thank all the Prentice Hall staff who helped in producing the book, especially John Ragozzine, Kari Callaghan Mazzola, and Heather Shelstad. Cathal J. Nolan of Boston University provided insightful comments on the draft. And Charles Kegley deserves a special note of thanks for shepherding this book through the entire process, from idea to finished product. Joel H. Rosenthal
First Chapter

It is tempting to think of 1991-2001 as the "post-Cold War" decade. As such, it is a transitional period, a relatively benign time when the great powers paused before a new mortal challenge appeared. Such an interpretation is terribly mistaken.

While the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans will inevitably register as relatively minor episodes in the broad sweep of American history, tectonic changes occurred in the 1990s that will be felt for years to come. All of the fault lines that look so dangerous today preceded the earthquake of September 11, 2001. The agenda for the future has been hidden in plain sight for quite some time.

In geopolitical terms, the question of ethics and force is now largely about the values and goals of the United States. As the predominant military force in the world—far exceeding the capabilities of even the most advanced industrialized nations—the United States has demonstrated its willingness and capability to deliver lethal force to enforce a stable and predictable world order. The key concept for the next decade is the same as the last: asymmetry.

Asymmetry—a situation in which the combined military and economic power of one state creates a radical imbalance in power—is the result of American political will as well as the fruit of American technology. Americans have made it a priority to conduct research and development in military systems ranging from precision-guided munitions to satellite intelligence-gathering and missile defense. In political terms, Americans have also signaled willingness, beyond any other nation or group of nations, to spend the resources necessary to purchase and deploy these sophisticated systems. While this willingness might be reaching new heights after September 11, again, the pattern is nothing new.

One place where the pattern of the past may take a new turn is in the tendency of American planners to minimize risk to U.S. forces, to engage in force protection or riskless war. Michael Ignatieff has written about "virtual war"—war in technological superiority allows all risk to be exported to the enemy. The current war against terrorism will put stress on this notion. Hard choices will need to be made regarding risk and reward. What is it worth—in terms of U.S. casualties—to apprehend elusive terrorists? What should be done when long-range bombing is not sufficient? For the moment, Americans are clinging to the benefits of virtual war with understandable tenacity.

Another place where a familiar pattern will be tested is in the strict interpretation of noncombatant status and immunity. Military operations in the 1990s—largely humanitarian in nature—featured strong emphasis on maintaining the firewall between combatants and noncombatants. Human rights advocates and ethics critics often pointed to policies such as long-range bombing, dual-use targeting, and even the use of relatively indiscriminate economic sanctions as testing the limits of noncombatant immunity. But few doubted the intent of planners to limit collateral damage as much as possible. The struggle in the future will be over defining standards for "as much as possible." What is considered an acceptable amount of collateral damage in a war of self-defense might be different, and more permissive, than a war with humanitarian goals.

For all of the new stressors on our familiar pattern, the ultimate purposes for resorting to force are likely to continue unchanged. In addition to self-defense and the pursuit of human rights goals, force will be used to punish and deter. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are also likely to continue, as states will no longer be allowed to "fail." Failed states are obvious refuges for terrorists. In fighting what President George W. Bush has called the "axis of evil," there is pressure to put a face on that evil so that it can be eliminated. Whether that face is Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, or some other foe, we can anticipate ongoing efforts at targeting specific leaders as well as the states in which they are found.

New forms of warfare are already beginning to surface, although none are without precedent. We have seen the beginning of a new phase in the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The anthrax attack of fall 2001 may be a precursor of future threats. The first response has been the creation of the Office of Homeland Defense. Whether further reform of the U.S. defense establishment is necessary to meet this threat remains to be seen. It is not hard to imagine a reassessment of the National Security Act of 1947—the act that created the current structure in anticipation of the Cold War that followed. In addition to the real threat of chemical and biological attacks, cyberwarfare lurks as yet another threat to American security.

As American policymakers think about their options for defense, they will face the question of how much offense do we need to provide a good defense? Should the United States and its allies seek regime changes in places such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea? Is preemption the wave of the future? Fighting nonstate terror networks raises the question of how much responsibility can be assigned to the states where terrorism and threat to Western interests reside. Strategists are facing a world with no clearly defined defense perimeter.

American hegemony raises as many questions for the ethicist as it does for the strategist. As the United States fights its wars of the next decade, it will surely follow both the law of armed conflict, and to the extent possible, evolving human rights law and the principles of the just war tradition. But clear-cut answers as to the most ethical policy choices are not likely to be available. The war against the al Qaeda terrorist network has raised controversial questions regarding nonstate actors and their status under international law. We can anticipate more such cases where the law is unclear and precedents will be set.

The best assurance of an ethical foreign policy is an assurance that new policies will be openly debated—that interested citizens will test these policies against the principles and standards that American policymakers themselves profess. Taking a realist perspective, this book is premised on the idea that ethics is not always about achieving consensus on moral ideals. Sometimes the best we can do is to articulate and negotiate differences. Realists understand that the journey to "a just world" is a journey that can never be completed. But in reflecting on where we have been and where we are going, we can surely strive to do our part well. At the top of our agenda for the future should be a commitment to relate reason to experience, to test principles against tough cases, and to hold our policies up to scrutiny. In the end, this process is what ultimately will make our foreign policies as ethical as they can be.

The editors would like to thank the numerous individuals who helped organize the meetings that produced these chapters, and those who helped in the editing process. At the Carnegie Council, Eva Becker, Vice President for Finance and Administration, provided assistance throughout the project. Matt Mattern and Lotta Hagman helped in planning and organizing the meetings. Janice Gabucan and Vivek Nayar helped in the editing stages. The editors would also like to thank all the Prentice Hall staff who helped in producing the book, especially John Ragozzine, Kari Callaghan Mazzola, and Heather Shelstad. Cathal J. Nolan of Boston University provided insightful comments on the draft. And Charles Kegley deserves a special note of thanks for shepherding this book through the entire process, from idea to finished product.

Joel H. Rosenthal

Summaries
Long Description
For introductory courses in International Relations, National Security, U.S. Foreign Policy and U.S. Diplomatic History. Born of a multiyear, interdisciplinary collaborative project consisting of experts in international affairs, military strategy, diplomacy and ethics, this book focuses on the moral dimension of international and military affairs as it explores a series of moral dilemmas facing the U.S. national security and military communities. The book focuses on the moral norms, procedures, and outcomes of military action, and its interdisciplinary and interprofessional approach demonstrates the need to examine issues from a variety of angles to achieve a full understanding of international affairs.
Main Description
Born of a multiyear, interdisciplinary collaborative project consisting of experts in international affairs, military strategy, diplomacy and ethics, this book focuses on the moral dimension of international and military affairs as it explores a series of moral dilemmas facing the US national security and military communities. The book focuses on the moral norms, procedures and outcomes of military action and its interdisciplinary and interprofessional approach demonstrates the need to examine issues from a variety of angles to achieve a full understanding of international affairs. Essays address the following issues: War, Strategy and Ethics; The Politics and Ethics of Rescue; Military Strategy and Terrorism; From Just War to Just Peace; From Moral Norm to Criminal Code: The Law of Armed Conflicts and the Restraint of Contemporary Warfare; What's Living and What's Dead in Nuclear Ethics; Living with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Ethical Considerations; Technology and the Battlefield: Moral Dilemmas on the Battlefield; Matching Moral Expectation and Military Capabilities in Modern Warfare; and Strategic Theory, Military Practice and the Laws of War: The Case of Strategic Bombing. For anyone interested in current international conflict.
Main Description
Born of a multiyear, interdisciplinary collaborative project consisting of experts in international affairs, military strategy, diplomacy and ethics, this book focuses on the moral dimension of international and military affairs as it explores a series of moral dilemmas facing the US national security and military communities. The book focuses on the moral norms, procedures and outcomes of military action and its interdisciplinary and interprofessional approach demonstrates the need to examine issues from a variety of angles to achieve a full understanding of international affairs.Essays address the following issues: War, Strategy and Ethics; The Politics and Ethics of Rescue; Military Strategy and Terrorism; From Just War to Just Peace; From Moral Norm to Criminal Code: The Law of Armed Conflicts and the Restraint of Contemporary Warfare; What's Living and What's Dead in Nuclear Ethics; Living with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Ethical Considerations; Technology and the Battlefield: Moral Dilemmas on the Battlefield; Matching Moral Expectation and Military Capabilities in Modern Warfare; and Strategic Theory, Military Practice and the Laws of War: The Case of Strategic Bombing.For anyone interested in current international conflict.
Table of Contents
Jus Ad Bellum
War, Strategy, and Ethics
The Politics and Ethics of Rescue
Military Strategy and Terrorism
From Just War to Just Peace
Jus In Bello
From Moral Norm to Criminal Code: The Law of Armed Conflicts and the Restraint of Contemporary Warfare
What's Living and What's Dead in Nuclear Ethics
Living with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Ethical Considerations
Technology and the Battlefield: Moral Dilemmas on the Battlefield
Slouching toward Kosovo: Matching Moral Expectations and Military Capabilities in Modern Warfare
Strategic Theory, Military Practice and the Laws of War: The Case of Strategic Bombing
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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