Catalogue


The politics of property rights : political instability, credible commitments, and economic growth in Mexico, 1876-1929 /
Stephen Huber, Noel Maurer, Armando Razo.
imprint
Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003.
description
xx, 382 p. ; 24 cm.
ISBN
0521820677 (hardback)
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
imprint
Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003.
isbn
0521820677 (hardback)
catalogue key
5015279
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 2004-02-01:
This sequel to Maurer's The Power and the Money: The Mexican Financial System, 1876-1932 (CH, May'03) argues that in spite of the liberal mystique of the Porfiriato, the state intervened frequently and resorted to monopoly and quasi-monopoly protectionist practices in the banking sector. The authors advance an intriguing hypothesis that the "vertical political integration" (VPI) alliance (typically, asset holders, weak and revenue-hungry governments, and those dependent on the rent from good asset performance) made sure that property rights were protected and even advanced for the collective interests of stakeholders. The book offers two controversial theses to chew on. First, the book is a revisionist study of Mexico's economic history par excellence, and as such will have limited applicability to other Latin American countries. The second thesis--political instability does not affect economic growth negatively--needs to be tested outside Latin America as a viable social science theory. The growth and development trajectory of Malaysia since the early 1970s fits nicely with the VPI thesis, while the political stability of India since its independence has not helped its economic growth any more than the political violence of the Pinochet era hurt Chile's growth. The book is insightful, creative, and well articulated. A must-read for all. ^BSumming Up: Essential. Upper-division undergraduates and above. E. Pang Colorado School of Mines
Reviews
Review Quotes
"An impressive volume wih useful and clever statistical measurements of the performance of various parts of the economy, and it certainly is valuable addition to the economic history of Mexico." EH.net
"Helps to unpack the diffuclt instability-growth puzzle."APSA Perspectives on Politics
This item was reviewed in:
Choice, February 2004
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Summaries
Description for Bookstore
This book, first published in 2003, is intended for historians of Latin America and scholars interested in economic development. It offers a detailed economic history of Mexico and a theory about how rent seeking permits economic growth. The book explains why political instability is not necessarily correlated with economic stagnation.
Main Description
This book, first published in 2003, addresses a puzzle in political economy: why is it that political instability does not necessarily translate into economic stagnation or collapse? In order to address this puzzle, it advances a theory about property rights systems in many less developed countries. In this theory, governments do not have to enforce property rights as a public good. Instead, they may enforce property rights selectively (as a private good), and share the resulting rents with the group of asset holders who are integrated into the government. Focusing on Mexico, this book explains how the property rights system was constructed during the Porfirio Daz dictatorship (1876–1911) and then explores how this property rights system either survived, or was reconstructed. The result is an analytic economic history of Mexico under both stability and instability, and a generalizable framework about the interaction of political and economic institutions.
Description for Bookstore
This book is intended for historians of Latin America and scholars interested in economic development. It offers a detailed economic history of Mexico and a theory about how rent seeking permits economic growth. The book explains why political instability is not necessarily correlated with economic stagnation.
Description for Bookstore
This detailed economic history of Mexico advances a theory about how rent seeking permits economic growth. The book explains why political instability is not necessarily correlated with economic stagnation. It addresses the puzzle of growth amidst instability by combining analytic tools and theoretical insights from all history, political science and economics. This study is for historians of Latin America, scholars interested in economic development, and political scientists interested in the political foundations of growth.
Main Description
This book addresses a puzzle in political economy: why is it that political instability does not necessarily translate into economic stagnation or collapse? In order to address this puzzle, it advances a theory about property rights systems in many less developed countries. In this theory, governments do not have to enforce property rights as a public good. Instead, they may enforce property rights selectively (as a private good), and share the resulting rents with the group of asset holders who are integrated into the government. Focusing on Mexico, this book explains how the property rights system was constructed during the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship (1876-1911) and then explores how this property rights system either survived, or was reconstructed. The result is an analytic economic history of Mexico under both stability and instability, and a generalizable framework about the interaction of political and economic institutions.
Main Description
This detailed economic history of Mexico presents a theory about how rent seeking permits economic growth and explains why political instability is not necessarily correlated with economic stagnation. It is intended for historians of Latin America, scholars interested in economic development, and political scientists interested in the political foundations of growth. Hb ISBN (2003): 0-521-82067-7
Bowker Data Service Summary
The authors offer a detailed economic history of Mexico & a theory about how rent seeking permits economic growth. The book explains why political instability is not necessarily correlated with economic stagnation.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Theory: instability, credible commitments, and growth
VPI coalitions in historical perspective: Mexico's turbulent politics, 1876-1929
Finance
Industry
Petroleum
Mining
Agriculture
Conclusion
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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