Coalition defection : the dissolution of the Arab anti-Israeli coalitions in war and peace /
Avi Kober.
Westport, CT : Praeger, 2002.
xv, 218 p.
0275977226 (alk. paper)
More Details
Westport, CT : Praeger, 2002.
0275977226 (alk. paper)
catalogue key
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
About the Author
Author Affiliation
Avi Kober is Lecturer in Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and Research Associate at BESA Center for Strategic Studies.
Review Quotes
'œ[o]ffers a unique and important contribution to the study of Arab-Israeli relations....[W]hile Kober's research target academicians and military and national security specialists, he skillfully sets out a cogent and cohesive argument. Anyone with a keen interest in Arab-Israeli relations or Middle Eastern affairs will find Coalition Defection a valuable contribution.'' History
This item was reviewed in:
Reference & Research Book News, February 2003
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Long Description
Since the creation of Israel, during both wartime and peacetime, many Arab coalitions have formed. Every one of these anti-Israel coalitions has failed to achieve its goals due to the defection of one or more major parties. Kober explores the forces behind the dissemination of these alliances to determine why Arab states chose defection; whether or not a distinction can be made between defection patterns in times of war and patterns related to peace processes; and possible explanations for different behavior patterns. The multi-polar structure of the Arab subsystem, the decisions of pivotal members, and the negative reputations earned by such coalitions have always made defection an easy alternative. The choice to defect was, Kober contends, nurtured by a sense of military weakness and by the priority that coalition members attached to their particular interests over general Arab concerns. Kober finds that defection in time of war has arisen mainly through evasion-passive avoidance of coalition obligations with the hope of escaping or minimizing expected losses. Defection from military coalitions often deprived the defector of maximizing gains, all the while weakening the remaining coalition members. However, defection during the peace process served not only to optimize the defector's utilities, but eventually proved beneficial for the parties left behind. Kober determines that the peace process, mainly due to superpower involvement, transformed the scenario from a zero-sum to a non-zero-sum game, by rewarding the parties for signing treaties with Israel. Also, the first defectors, such as Egypt, established pay-off precedents, creating the foundation for future negotiations between the Arab players and Israel.
Table of Contents
Prefacep. vii
Defection from Coalitions in War and Peacep. 1
Arab Coalitions and the Arab-Israeli Conflictp. 39
Defection from Anti-Israel War Coalitionsp. 59
Arab Coalition Defection During Diplomatic Processesp. 87
Notesp. 131
A Paradox of Optimization?p. 141
Why Don't They Stick Together?p. 181
Bibliographyp. 193
Indexp. 211
About the Authorp. 219
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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