Catalogue

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The gold standard illusion : France, the Bank of France, and the International Gold Standard, 1914-1939 /
Kenneth Mouré.
imprint
Oxford, UK. ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2002.
description
xiv, 297 p.
ISBN
0199249040
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
imprint
Oxford, UK. ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2002.
isbn
0199249040
catalogue key
4687592
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
Reviews
Review Quotes
Mouré is the first historian to make such an extensive use of the archives of the Bank of France. He provides the reader with a well-balanced, complete and up-to-date review of the literature.
"Provides the reader with a well-balanced, complete and up-to-date review of the literature.... very convincing."--EH-NET
"Provides the reader with a well-balanced, complete and up-to-date review of the literature.... very convincing."-- EH-NET
Scholarly ... Mouré tells the story with an impressive narrative verve and, unusually, tries to see the situation from a French perspective.
Timely ... The strength of the book lies in its analysis of the politics of the Banque, an analysis that makes use of new archival evidence ... Mouré explains technical terms like 'gold points' with admirable clarity, and the book may be read with advantage by anyone interested in French political or economic history.
Introduction 1. The gold standard and central banking to 1914 2. The worm in the fruit 3. Deflation in practice 4. The franc in peril 5. The guillotine's clean cut: The Bank of France and the Poincare stabilization 6. Rather a faith than a theory: central bank co-operation, 1916-30 7. The gold standard illusion 8. Towards modern central banking 9. Conclusions Appendix I Appendix II
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Summaries
Bowker Data Service Summary
This study provides a history of French gold policy and the Bank of France, re-examines interwar bank co-operation, and looks at how gold standard rhetoric fostered misperceptions of financial problems.
Long Description
Did French gold policy cause the Great Depression? The Gold Standard Illusion draws on newly-available French records to test the gold standard interpretation of the Great Depression. It provides a history of French economic understanding, policy-making, and politics with regard to gold, monetary policy, and the key role of financial problems in political instability from 1914 to 1939.
Long Description
Economic historians have established a new orthodoxy attributing the onset and severity of the Great Depression to the flawed workings of the international gold standard. This interpretation returns French gold policy to centre stage in understanding the origins of the Depression, its rapid spread, its severity and its duration. The Gold Standard Illusion exploits new archival resources to test how well this gold standard interpretation of the Great Depression is sustainedby historical records in France, the country most often criticized for hoarding gold and failure to play by the rules of the gold standard game. The study follows four lines of inquiry, providing a history of French gold policy in its national and international contexts from 1914 to 1939, an analysis of theevolution of the Bank of France during this period and the degree to which gold standard belief retarded the adoption of modern central banking practice, a re-examination of interwar central bank cooperation in the period and its role in the breakdown of the gold standard, and a study of how gold standard rhetoric fostered misperceptions of financial and monetary problems.The French case was exceptional, marked by absolute and tenacious faith in the gold standard, by the import and accumulation of a vast hoard of gold desperately needed as reserves to prevent monetary contraction abroad, and by adamant claims for the need to return to gold after most countries had left the gold standard, which had become, in the words of John Maynard Keynes, 'a curse laid upon the economic life of the world'. The Gold Standard Illusion explains French gold standardbelief and policy, the impact of French policy at home and abroad, and reassesses the gold standard interpretation of the Great Depression in the light of French experience.
Main Description
Economic historians have established a new orthodoxy attributing the onset and severity of the Great Depression to the flawed workings of the international gold standard. This interpretation returns French gold policy to centre stage in understanding the origins of the Depression, its rapidspread, its severity and its duration. The Gold Standard Illusion exploits new archival resources to test how well this gold standard interpretation of the Great Depression is sustained by historical records in France, the country most often criticized for hoarding gold and failure to play by therules of the gold standard game. The study follows four lines of inquiry, providing a history of French gold policy in its national and international contexts from 1914 to 1939, an analysis of the evolution of the Bank of France during this period and the degree to which gold standard beliefretarded the adoption of modern central banking practice, a re-examination of interwar central bank cooperation in the period and its role in the breakdown of the gold standard, and a study of how gold standard rhetoric fostered misperceptions of financial and monetary problems.The French case was exceptional, marked by absolute and tenacious faith in the gold standard, by the import and accumulation of a vast hoard of gold desperately needed as reserves to prevent monetary contraction abroad, and by adamant claims for the need to return to gold after most countries hadleft the gold standard, which had become, in the words of John Maynard Keynes, 'a curse laid upon the economic life of the world'. The Gold Standard Illusion explains French gold standard belief and policy, the impact of French policy at home and abroad, and reassesses the gold standardinterpretation of the Great Depression in the light of French experience.
Main Description
'Mouré is the first historian to make such an extensive use of the archives of the Bank of France. He provides the reader with a well-balanced, complete and up-to-date review of the literature.' -EH.Net Book Review'Scholarly... Mouré tells the story with an impressive narrative verve and, unusually, tries to see the situation from a French perspective.' -Tim Congdon, Times Literary SupplementDid French gold policy cause the Great Depression? The Gold Standard Illusion draws on newly-available French records to test the gold standard interpretation of the Great Depression. It provides a history of French economic understanding, policy-making, and politics with regard to gold, monetary policy, and the key role of financial problems in political instability from 1914 to 1939.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The gold standard and central banking to 1914
The worm in the fruit
Deflation in practice
The franc in peril
The guillotine's clean cut: The Bank of France and the Poincare stabilization
Rather a faith than a theory: central bank co-operation, 1916-30
The gold standard illusion
Towards modern central banking
Conclusions
Appendix I
Appendix II
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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