Catalogue


The making of the Cold War enemy : culture and politics in the military-intellectual complex /
Ron Robin.
imprint
Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2001.
description
xvi, 277 p. : ill.
ISBN
0691011710
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
imprint
Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2001.
isbn
0691011710
catalogue key
4375898
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
Excerpts
Flap Copy
"A first-rate book by a first-rate historian. Among works on the Cold War, Ron Robins book stands out on account of the sheer quality of its exposition and analysis and because of its attention to the less-studied and distinctly problematical field of behavior sciences. The Making of the Cold War Enemy will attract readers interested in the Cold War and its culture, American intellectual history, and the Korean and Vietnam wars."-- Michael S. Sherry, Northwestern University "Ron Robin has written a fascinating account of the ideology of Cold War America, focusing on the emergence of the behavioral sciences. Most historians take as a given the intellectual assumptions of the Cold War. But few have offered a critical examination of the thinking behind the entire enterprise and/or analyzed in any detail how and why particular concepts became dominant. Robin does both, brilliantly, in this book."-- Marilyn B. Young, New York University
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 2001-11-01:
Robin (history, Haifa Univ., Israel) weaves an entirely plausible but weirdly improbable true tale of the making of Cold War policy. Although the Soviet Union became the US's nuclear bogeyman, capable of slipping into collective nightmares and panicking Americans into paranoia, Robin shows that it was the entirety of the worrisome world beyond US borders that needed the comfort of pseudo-scientific explanation. The collective union of leading social science expertise and an irrational need to categorize, simplify, and ultimately demonize an increasingly anti-American world is a story worth telling, and Robin does so magnificently. Though the process starts with government decision makers eager to tap into the scientific expertise of academia, the end is ultimately captured by the method and its defective outputs are applied to US interventions from Korea through Desert Storm. Robin oversimplifies matters in attempting to reduce the story to behavioralism's contempt for complexity, uncritical acceptance of prevailing cultural norms, and the denial of its own limitations, but this is a minor criticism. Readers may agree or disagree with Robin's conclusions, but the book brilliantly highlights the frailty and ultimately the absurdity of applying model theory to real-world problems. This is an academic gem. Recommended at all levels. E. C. Dolman United States Air University
Reviews
Review Quotes
"Brilliantly highlights the frailty and ultimately the absurdity of applying model theory to real-world problems. This is an academic gem."-- Choice
"Robin has not only significantly added to the literature on Korea and Vietnam but also given us an impressive historical consideration, at once moving and sobering, on the perils that occur when social science gets too close to policy. The book should be required reading in political science."-- Anders Stephanson, International History Review
"While a good deal of work has been done on the role of academics in nuclear weapons research laboratories, Robin's study goes beyond the 'wizards of Armageddon' to focus on the role of academics and think tanks in the development of Cold War strategy. His study offers an original, and damning, assessment of the role of behavioralists and the willingness of academics to abandon inquiry in favor of conformity."-- Walter L. Hixson, American Historical Review
An insightful addition to a growing body of literature assessing the intellectual history of Cold War America. Robin traces an expansive network linking universities, think tanks, and foundations to the psychological warfare strategies deployed on the battlefields of Korea and Vietnam. Robin's book provides an excellent analysis of the way that social scientific inquiry and Cold War policy reinforced each other. It will be of great interest to intellectual historians as well as scholars of American foreign relations."-- Michael E. Latham, The Journal of American History
"Although no reader is likely to be struck by the judiciousness of The Making of the Cold War Enemy , it merits the highest praise for its cogency, insights, and bite."-- Stephen J. Whitfield, Journal of Cold War Studies
" The Making of the Cold War Enemy presents an important perspective with far-reaching moral, political and intellectual implications regarding the post-WWII behavioral science project. . . . Robin's book thus deserves our careful consideration."-- Mark Solovey, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences
This item was reviewed in:
Choice, November 2001
To find out how to look for other reviews, please see our guides to finding book reviews in the Sciences or Social Sciences and Humanities.
Summaries
Main Description
At the height of the Cold War, the U.S. government enlisted the aid of a select group of psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists to blueprint enemy behavior. Not only did these academics bring sophisticated concepts to what became a project of demonizing communist societies, but they influenced decision-making in the map rooms, prison camps, and battlefields of the Korean War and in Vietnam. With verve and insight, Ron Robin tells the intriguing story of the rise of behavioral scientists in government and how their potentially dangerous, "American" assumptions about human behavior would shape U.S. views of domestic disturbances and insurgencies in Third World countries for decades to come. Based at government-funded think tanks, the experts devised provocative solutions for key Cold War dilemmas, including psychological warfare projects, negotiation strategies during the Korean armistice, and morale studies in the Vietnam era. Robin examines factors that shaped the scientists' thinking and explores their psycho-cultural and rational choice explanations for enemy behavior. He reveals how the academics' intolerance for complexity ultimately reduced the nation's adversaries to borderline psychotics, ignored revolutionary social shifts in post-World War II Asia, and promoted the notion of a maniacal threat facing the United States. Putting the issue of scientific validity aside, Robin presents the first extensive analysis of the intellectual underpinnings of Cold War behavioral sciences in a book that will be indispensable reading for anyone interested in the era and its legacy.
Unpaid Annotation
"A first-rate book by a first-rate historian. Among works on the Cold War, Ron Robin's book stands out on account of the sheer quality of its exposition and analysis and because of its attention to the less-studied and distinctly problematical field of behavior sciences. "The Making of the Cold War Enemy will attract readers interested in the Cold War and its culture, American intellectual history, and the Korean and Vietnam wars."--Michael S. Sherry, Northwestern University"Ron Robin has written a fascinating account of the ideology of Cold War America, focusing on the emergence of the behavioral sciences. Most historians take as a given the intellectual assumptions of the Cold War. But few have offered a critical examination of the thinking behind the entire enterprise and/or analyzed in any detail how and why particular concepts became dominant. Robin does both, brilliantly, in this book."--Marilyn B. Young, New York University
Unpaid Annotation
At the height of the Cold War, the U.S. government enlisted the aid of a select group of psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists to blueprint enemy behavior. Not only did these academics bring sophisticated concepts to what became a project of demonizing communist societies, but they influenced decision-making in the map rooms, prison camps, and battlefields of the Korean War and in Vietnam. With verve and insight, Ron Robin tells the intriguing story of the rise of behavioral scientists in government and how their potentially dangerous, "American" assumptions about human behavior would shape U.S. views of domestic disturbances and insurgencies in Third World countries for decades to come.Based at government-funded think tanks, the experts devised provocative solutions for key Cold War dilemmas, including psychological warfare projects, negotiation strategies during the Korean armistice, and morale studies in the Vietnam era. Robin examines factors that shaped the scientists' thinking and explores their psycho-cultural and rational choice explanations for enemy behavior. He reveals how the academics' intolerance for complexity ultimately reduced the nation's adversaries to borderline psychotics, ignored revolutionary social shifts in post-World War II Asia, and promoted the notion of a maniacal threat facing the United States.Putting the issue of scientific validity aside, Robin presents the first extensive analysis of the intellectual underpinnings of Cold War behavioral sciences in a book that will be indispensable reading for anyone interested in the era and its legacy.
Table of Contents
List of Illustrationsp. ix
List of Abbreviationsp. xi
Acknowledgmentsp. xv
Introduction: Rumors of an Enemyp. 3
Defining the Paradigm
Inventing the Behavioral Sciencesp. 19
The Culture of Think Tanksp. 38
Psychopolitics and Primary Groups: Theories of Culture and Society in Cold War Academiap. 57
Normal Science
The Obstinate Audience: The Art of Information Management in the Cold Warp. 75
The War of Ideas:Ideologyand Science in Psychological Warfarep. 94
Deus ex Clinica : Psychopolitics and Elite Studies of Communismp. 124
Collective Behavior in Totalitarian Societies: The Analysis of Enemy Pows in Koreap. 144
Prison Camps and Culture Wars: The Korean Brainwashing Controversyp. 162
Crisis
Vietnam: From "Hearts and Minds" to "Rational Choice"p. 185
Paradigm Lost: The Project Camelot Affairp. 206
Epilogue:Report from Iron Mountain and Beyondp. 226
Notesp. 239
Indexp. 271
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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