Catalogue


Allies and adversaries : the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. strategy in World War II /
Mark A. Stoler.
imprint
Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, c2000.
description
xxii, 380 p. ; 25 cm.
ISBN
0807825573 (cloth : alk. paper)
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
imprint
Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, c2000.
isbn
0807825573 (cloth : alk. paper)
catalogue key
4054644
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
About the Author
Author Affiliation
Mark A. Stoler is professor of history at the University of Vermont.
Excerpts
Flap Copy
Stoler's book examines the role and influence of the newly formed Joint Chiefs of Staff during WWII, when they assumed an unprecedented role. These individuals were officially responsible only for the nation's military forces, but their functions grew to encompass a host of foreign policy concerns. Only the president exercised a more decisive role in the outcome of certain issues.
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 2001-05-01:
Stoler (Univ. of Vermont) rejects two traditional assumptions about the US joint chiefs of staff (JCS) in the formulation of strategy during WW II: first, that armed services planners ventured beyond narrowly construed military matters into a larger geopolitical realm only with great reluctance; and, second, that they maintained a firmly held distrust of civilian influence while doing so. Mobilizing on an unprecedented scale for an overseas coalition war, the armed services finally gained specific guidance from President Franklin D. Roosevelt and an increased role in national policy making. Stoler takes pains not to overstate his case by understating elements of default and sees the JCS as far less naive than conventional wisdom has. Even before Casablanca, the chiefs of staff had attempted to improve the planning process by establishing the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. When FDR accepted the committee's recommendations for postwar bases and international security arrangements, a watershed had been reached: the US military would thereafter play a permanent role in the design of its nation's foreign policy. Nevertheless, cautions Stoler, the extent to which military policy shaped--as opposed to reflected--presidential policy cannot always be known with absolute certainty. Such evenhandedness makes his other conclusions that much more convincing. Upper-division undergraduates and above. J. Daley Pittsburg State University
Reviews
Review Quotes
Stoler's work is seminal, forcing us to rethink radically much about the war we thought we knew so well. ( Intelligence & National Security )
This is a soundly researched bookAmerican Historical Review
This is a soundly researched book American Historical Review
A lucid, logical examination of US military thinking . . . from the late 1930s through . . . the Second World War. Times Literary Supplement
Stoler has provided an altogether worthy study.Washington Post Book World
Stoler has provided an altogether worthy study. Washington Post Book World
Stoler's work is seminal, forcing us to rethink radically much about the war we thought we knew so well. (Intelligence & National Security)
Allies and Adversaries marks Stoler as one of the finest military and diplomatic historians of his age. (ARMY)
Allies and Adversaries marks Stoler as one of the finest military and diplomatic historians of his age. ( ARMY )
A lucid, logical examination of US military thinking . . . from the late 1930s through . . . the Second World War.Times Literary Supplement
This item was reviewed in:
Washington Post, January 2001
Choice, May 2001
To find out how to look for other reviews, please see our guides to finding book reviews in the Sciences or Social Sciences and Humanities.
Summaries
Main Description
The wartime rise of military influence in U.S. foreign policy Formed soon after Pearl Harbor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were officially responsible only for the nation's military forces. Their functions grew to encompass a host of foreign policy concerns during World War II, however, when the military voice assumed an unprecedented importance. Analyzing the wartime rise of military influence in U.S. foreign policy, Mark Stoler focuses on the evolution of and debates over U.S. and Allied global strategy. In the process, he examines military fears regarding America's major allies--Great Britain and the Soviet Union--and how those fears affected President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies, interservice and civil-military relations, military-academic relations, and postwar national security policy.
Main Description
During World War II the uniformed heads of the U.S. armed services assumed a pivotal and unprecedented role in the formulation of the nation's foreign policies. Organized soon after Pearl Harbor as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these individuals were officially responsible only for the nation's military forces. During the war their functions came to encompass a host of foreign policy concerns, however, and so powerful did the military voice become on those issues that only the president exercised a more decisive role in their outcome. Drawing on sources that include the unpublished records of the Joint Chiefs as well as the War, Navy, and State Departments, Mark Stoler analyzes the wartime rise of military influence in U.S. foreign policy. He focuses on the evolution of and debates over U.S. and Allied global strategy. In the process, he examines military fears regarding America's major allies--Great Britain and the Soviet Union--and how those fears affected President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies, interservice and civil-military relations, military-academic relations, and postwar national security policy as well as wartime strategy.
Long Description
During World War II the uniformed heads of the U.S. armed services assumed a pivotal and unprecedented role in the formulation of the nation's foreign policies. Organized soon after Pearl Harbor as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these individuals were officially responsible only for the nation's military forces. During the war their functions came to encompass a host of foreign policy concerns, however, and so powerful did the military voice become on those issues that only the president exercised a more decisive role in their outcome.Drawing on sources that include the unpublished records of the Joint Chiefs as well as the War, Navy, and State Departments, Mark Stoler analyzes the wartime rise of military influence in U.S. foreign policy. He focuses on the evolution of and debates over U.S. and Allied global strategy. In the process, he examines military fears regarding America's major allies--Great Britain and the Soviet Union--and how those fears affected President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies, interservice and civil-military relations, military-academic relations, and postwar national security policy as well as wartime strategy.
Table of Contents
Prefacep. ix
Acknowledgmentsp. xv
Abbreviationsp. xix
Code Namesp. xxi
The Armed Forces and National Policy before World War IIp. 1
New Strategies and Policies for a Coalition War, 1939-1941p. 23
Civil-Military and Coalition Conflicts, February-December 1941p. 41
Global Strategy Reconsidered, December 1941-July 1942p. 64
The Great Strategic Debate, July 1942-January 1943p. 84
Britain as Adversary, January-October 1943p. 103
Russia as Ally and Enigma, December 1942-October 1943p. 123
Civil-Military Coordination and Conflict, February 1942-November 1943p. 146
The Big Two, October 1943-September 1944p. 165
National versus International Postwar Security and Civil-Military Relations, January 1944-January 1945p. 191
Second Thoughts on the Allies, September 1944-April 1945p. 211
Victory and Reassessment, April-August 1945p. 231
Aftermath and Conclusionsp. 258
Notesp. 271
Bibliographyp. 335
Indexp. 357
Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved.

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