Catalogue


Banners to the breeze : the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River /
Earl J. Hess.
imprint
Lincoln ; London : University of Nebraska Press, 2000.
description
xiv, 252 p. : ill., maps ; 24 cm.
ISBN
0803223803 (cloth : alk. paper)
format(s)
Book
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More Details
author
imprint
Lincoln ; London : University of Nebraska Press, 2000.
isbn
0803223803 (cloth : alk. paper)
catalogue key
3513883
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A Look Inside
First Chapter


Chapter One

Banners to the Breeze

The first half of 1862 was disastrous for the Confederate army in the West. Beginning with Forts Henry and Donelson in February, the South suffered one defeat after another. An entire field army of some fifteen thousand men surrendered at Fort Donelson, leading to the collapse of Confederate defenses in southern Kentucky and western and central Tennessee. That vast area, with its rich storehouse of goods and agricultural products, was laid open to the Yankee invaders. The Federal offensive temporarily came to a halt at Shiloh when the Army of the Mississippi under Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston surprised the Army of the Tennessee under Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant in its camps on a peaceful spring morning. The fighting that day, April 6, 1862, was fierce and bloody, but Grant's troops blunted the Confederate attacks and held their forward base of supplies at Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River. Grant was joined that night by the Army of the Ohio under Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell. Together, the two Federal armies drove the outnumbered Rebels away. Johnston was killed, shot accidentally by his own men, on April 6. Now led by Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard, the Army of the Mississippi retreated safely back to Corinth. The Rebels failed to crush Grant or prevent his juncture with Buell and had suffered nearly twelve thousand casualties, but they put almost thirteen thousand Federal troops out of action in the two-day battle.

    Reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi and new regiments from the North enabled Grant and Buell to hold the strategic advantage. But they would not be given the opportunity to continue the advance toward Corinth on their own. Their superior, Maj. Gen. Henry Wager Halleck, hastened to take personal charge of their combined armies, which numbered over one hundred thousand men. Not until the Atlanta campaign of 1864 would the Union gather such a powerful host. Halleck began an overly cautious advance from Pittsburg Landing toward Corinth, fortifying his camps each night to avoid being caught by a surprise Confederate attack. Beauregard, with only fifty-five thousand men, could not risk an assault unless Halleck became careless and gave him an opportunity. The Federal general, engaged in the only field campaign of his career, did not offer his opponent such a chance. As a result, the famed "siege" of Corinth resulted in several small fights but no significant battle. Halleck accomplished his goal through maneuver and relying on earthworks to protect his painfully slow progress. Beauregard was forced to evacuate the town on May 30, 1862, with his army intact.

    The fall of Corinth was hailed by the press, as a great triumph of Federal arms, even though Halleck had failed to damage the Confederate army. His own soldiers did not believe this assessment. They were disappointed that, after all their marching, digging, and high expectations, Beauregard's troops were still a strong, potent force barring their way south. Yet the capture of Corinth was the culmination of an immense gain of territory. The Union offensive that accomplished this feat was unprecedented in size and in the geographic expanse it covered. No previous campaign in American history had involved the movement of so many troops over such a large area. All of Kentucky had been cleared of Confederate troops and all of western and central Tennessee was either in Union hands or open to Federal occupation forces. Nashville became the first Confederate state capital to fall to the North. The entire length of the Mississippi River through the Upper South was cleared of Rebel forces, and several heavily fortified strongholds, including Columbus, Kentucky, Island No. 10 on the border between Missouri and Tennessee, and Fort Pillow, sixty miles north of Memphis, had fallen with little loss of life. The important commercial port of Memphis was under Northern control after a brief but showy gunboat battle on the river. The rest of the Mississippi River south of Memphis lay open to further attacks by combined land and naval forces. Only two strongpoints were still held by Confederate forces on the long stretch of the river between Memphis and New Orleans, Vicksburg and Port Hudson. They would be under attack a few weeks after the fall of Corinth.

    Farther west, other Federal forces duplicated the success of Grant and Buell east of the Mississippi. The small but tenacious Army of the Southwest, under Brig. Gen. Samuel Ryan Curtis, had driven into northwestern Arkansas and fought a pivotal battle at Pea Ridge, blunting an attempted invasion of Union-held Missouri by the Confederate Army of the West under Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn. Still farther west, a Confederate attempt to invade New Mexico Territory was defeated by a combination of logistical problems and stiff resistance by the scattered Federal forces in that distant region.

    Even in Virginia, where much larger armies lumbered over much shorter distances with huge mountains of supplies, Federal armies were on the move. The nation's attention was focused on the Army of the Potomac and its young commander, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan. By the time Corinth fell to Halleck's men, McClellan landed his army on the Yorktown Peninsula and began a slow, careful advance toward Richmond. Displaying even more caution and digging just as many earthworks to protect his gains as Halleck had, McClellan spent the month of April 1862 dislodging a much smaller Confederate force from its heavily fortified position at Yorktown. He suffered another delay on May 30 and June 1, 1862, when the Confederate army of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston attacked him near Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, only a dozen miles from Richmond. Although the Rebel assaults were repulsed and Johnston was severely wounded, McClellan was plagued by false reports that the Confederate army outnumbered his own. He also was plagued by his own fear of failure and proceeded at an even slower and more cautious pace during the month of June. Still, despite Johnston's replacement by Gen. Robert E. Lee and the renaming of the army as the Army of Northern Virginia, a name that would later strike fear into many a Federal commander's heart, there was every reason to expect great things from McClellan and his men as spring gave way to summer.

    Yet this impressive string of Northern successes was in danger of unraveling. There were many reasons for this possibility, chief among them the overwhelming need for the Federal armies in the West to consolidate the tremendous gains they had made thus far. Halleck felt he had to disperse troops to key towns along the logistical network that supplied his army, which already was several hundreds of miles from its major supply depots in the North. These logistical matters were vital. The system of rivers and railroads that Grant and Buell had used to bring their armies thus far had been a strategic boon to the western Unionists, making it possible for them to come so far and conquer so much territory in a comparatively short time. This transportation system greatly aided in the conquest of the Upper South, but it did not so conveniently extend into the Deep South. Below Corinth, only one rail line penetrated the vast stretches of territory in central Mississippi, a region less well endowed with prosperous farms, good wagon roads, and navigable rivers than Kentucky and Tennessee. New logistical arrangements had to be considered before a further push south of Corinth was feasible.

    In short, the Union army in the West had reached the end of its rope. It had been easy enough to operate in the Upper South, for that area was adjacent to Northern territory and was well suited to the movement of large armies and their supplies. It had a long-settled population, dating back to the 1770s, and an excellent system of pikes and wagon roads. Railroads spanned the region, connecting the major cities with the rest of the country. The Tennessee, Cumberland, and Mississippi Rivers flowed north to south, giving Union commanders an opportunity to drive deeply into the region and easily supply their armies.

    The Deep South posed far more difficult problems for Halleck and his subordinates than did the Upper South. Mississippi and Alabama extended some four hundred miles north to south. These states had been largely settled only during the three decades before the firing on Fort Sumter. Their drier climate and less fertile soil failed to yield a diversified agriculture like that in Kentucky and Tennessee. Cotton was the key crop of the Deep South. A traveler through Mississippi and Alabama would have found the region dotted with large plantations separated by huge tracts of endless pine forests, with many small hardscrabble farms scattered across the land. Important cities were few and far between and railroads failed to penetrate large areas of this region. The river system did not take up where the railroads left off. Traveling upstream, a visitor on the Tennessee and Cumberland would veer eastward before penetrating the Deep South and find the waterways increasingly unnavigable. The rivers that penetrate the heart of Mississippi and Alabama flow largely in the southern halves of those states and are small and shallow. The only exception is the expansive sweep of the Mississippi, which gave Federal forces the opportunity to penetrate the Deep South on a very narrow front. The landlocked interior of the region remained a very poor place for the maneuvering and feeding of large numbers of troops.

    In short, the Deep South was an inhospital area for military operations. Federal forces could easily disperse in the Upper South to occupy important points that were connected by good roads and rail lines. There, the Civil War was truly a war to reclaim lost territory, show the flag in many towns large and small, and protect Unionists with permanent garrisons. Operations in the Deep South would have to be different. It would be impossible to spread out and occupy all regions there. The North simply did not have the manpower or the time to do that, and there were vast areas of the Deep South that were not worth holding. Instead, the strategy of the war in the Deep South would be dictated by the region's geography. Federal commanders would have to decide which areas were important enough to take and then prepare extensively to send armies into them. Penetrations of the Deep South would be on a very narrow, limited front, such as expeditions down the Mississippi or along the rail line from Chattanooga to Atlanta. They would have limited objectives rather than the all-embracing goal of reclaiming huge chunks of territory from the Confederate government. And logistics would play an even more crucial role in the success of these expeditions than in the Upper South. The operational and administrative capacities of the Union army would be tested to the extreme, and supply officers would be forced to develop and improve their technique as the war shifted from the Upper South to the lower states. The western Federals faced this problem long before their counterparts in Virginia for the war in the eastern theater never moved from the Upper to the Deep South. The war in the West was primarily a conflict of distances, of varied geography, climate, and land forms, of movement, and of real progress or failure measured by the shifting of forces over the map. Westerners would have to learn to become hardy campaigners as well as tough fighters on the battlefield, for their part of the war was won as much by moving over vast distances as by slugging it out with their enemy on a small field of battle.

    For all of these reasons Halleck was forced to stop after entering Corinth in late May. He refused to rush in pursuit of Beauregard's army, which retreated some sixty miles southward to Tupelo. His massive army would not have been able to feed itself adequately with the single line of railroad that led into central Mississippi. Two years later, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman would succeed in moving a similar number of men down the single track of line that penetrated northwestern Georgia during the Atlanta campaign. But that happened only because the Federal Army of the Cumberland, Buell's old army, had spent the intervening two years building up the equipment, supplies, and techniques for moving huge amounts of goods on a single track. Sherman could feed, provide ammunition, send reinforcements, and evacuate wounded men quickly over the rail line from Louisville to Nashville to Chattanooga all the way up to his advancing army. Halleck's army did not have that capability in the summer of 1862. And the only objective in Mississippi worth campaigning for, control of the Mississippi River, might well be gained without an overland invasion. Even then, an expedition was beginning to take shape among the forces that had captured New Orleans in April and had moved northward up the river to occupy Natchez and Baton Rouge. This combined force of oceangoing ships under Rear Adm. David G. Farragut and a small contingent of infantry under Brig. Gen. Thomas Williams might well clear the Mississippi without the aid of Halleck's army. Halleck had every reason to stop at Corinth and carefully consider his next move.

    He decided to direct his attention toward the west and east rather than the south. The need to consolidate Union gains seemed more important than moving into an uncertain campaign in difficult territory. West of the Mississippi, Samuel Ryan Curtis's small army was in danger. After Pea Ridge, Curtis had begun to march across Arkansas as Van Dorn moved eastward to join Beauregard at Corinth. Curtis was at the end of a precarious supply line of wagon trains that trundled over the rugged Ozark Mountains from Rolla, Missouri, more than two hundred miles away. Despite that problem, Curtis dallied at Batesville, hoping to move on and capture Little Rock, but he eventually decided to cut his supply line and march to Helena on the Mississippi. Halleck tried to help him by sending a supply fleet up the White River (which barely missed meeting Curtis's army) and then reconnecting Curtis's supply line down the river to Helena when the Army of the Southwest reached that town in July. Curtis had come close to occupying what would have been the second Confederate state capital to fall into Union hands. As it was, he demonstrated one successful tactic an invading army could use to solve logistical problems, living off the land. And he opened up the most advanced base of operations on the Mississippi River, sixty miles south of Memphis, for those forces that were tentatively moving south down the waterway.

    When Halleck turned his attention eastward, he found that consolidating Federal control over the rest of the Upper South would be far more difficult than supporting Curtis's little army. The Union concentration of manpower that had combined the Army of the Ohio with the Army of the Tennessee for the drive on Corinth had taken troops from huge areas of Kentucky and Tennessee. This concentration had allowed Grant and Buell to penetrate the Upper South on a very narrow front, essentially along the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. The Confederates had also concentrated their troops from the Upper South at Corinth to oppose this advance, adding men from as far away as Mobile, Pensacola, and the Trans-Mississippi. As a result, large areas of Tennessee were not controlled by either army and some parts of it were still held by comparatively small, isolated contingents. The Federals firmly held Nashville and most of Kentucky but little else. A small division of about eight thousand Federals under Brig. Gen. Ormsby McKnight Mitchell, from Buell's army, had penetrated northern Alabama in March, when the Army of the Ohio left Nashville to join Grant at Pittsburg Landing. Mitchell made it to Huntsville, a town in the Appalachian Mountains on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad that connected Corinth with Chattanooga. His small force lived precariously, forced to rely on supplies shipped by wagon from Nashville and on whatever the men could forage from the countryside. Mitchell survived by aggressively prowling the area to prevent the buildup of Confederate guerrillas and because the Rebels were too preoccupied with trying to stop Grant and Buell in western Tennessee to pay much attention to his division.

    Fortunately for him, the only sizable Confederate force in the area was nearly as vulnerable as he was. Maj. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith commanded fewer than ten thousand men who were strung out across the width of eastern Tennessee from Cumberland Gap, on the borders of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia, to Knoxville and to Chattanooga. Smith was barely able to maintain his position; his vulnerability was amply demonstrated in June, when a Federal division of some ten thousand men under Brig. Gen. George W. Morgan captured Cumberland Gap without a struggle. Morgan moved toward the gap down the Wilderness Road from the Bluegrass region of Kentucky. Although Cumberland Gap was an impressive topographic feature that amply deserved to be called the Gibraltar of the West, it could easily be turned by using any number of smaller passes that lay north and south. Morgan did this and was able to force the outnumbered garrison to give up the place. Cumberland Gap gave the Federals an avenue of advance into the heart of eastern Tennessee, including Knoxville, but it offered nothing else of strategic value. Yet its fall was a sign that the Federals were beginning the process of consolidating their positions all across the Upper South. Smith's men were in real danger of losing all of eastern Tennessee, including the vital railroad junction of Chattanooga. That city was the logistical gateway to Georgia and other areas of the Deep South, offering a rail line to any future Federal invasion of the southeastern portion of the Confederacy. In addition, rail lines running east and west also ran through Chattanooga, connecting Virginia with the western Confederacy. This small mountain town on the banks of the Tennessee, with its imposing geography, was one of the true strategic points of the war.

    By mid-June 1862 Halleck was ready to begin the process of securing the rest of the Upper South and preparing to invade Georgia. He sent Buell's Army of the Ohio eastward from Corinth to seize Chattanooga. Halleck ordered him to move "with all possible dispatch" and confidently expected his subordinate to be ready to invade Georgia in a few weeks. This was good news to Andrew Johnson, who had been appointed as military governor of Tennessee by President Abraham Lincoln the previous March. Johnson won this appointment because he had been the only member of the United States Senate from a seceded state who remained loyal to the Union. Although born in North Carolina, he had grown up in eastern Tennessee knowing the hard hand of poverty and the value of a strong Union, developing a hatred of slave owners that was stronger than his prejudice against black people. The prospect of freeing the many other Unionists in the mountains of Tennessee was a passion of his. "They are being treated worse than beasts of the forest and are appealing to the Government for relief & protection," he wrote to Halleck. The time was right for such a move on purely military grounds. Halleck assured Johnson that "East Tennessee will very soon be attended to."

    But Buell was not one to rush things. Born in Ohio forty-four years before, he had graduated in the lower ranks of the West Point class of 1841, a class that provided twenty generals to the Union and Confederate armies. Buell managed to compile an impressive military record before the war, serving in Florida, on the western frontier, and in Mexico. He was severely wounded at the battle of Churubusco during Winfield Scott's famous campaign to Mexico City but spent most of the postwar years on staff duty in the Adjutant General's Office. He received a brigadier general's commission immediately upon the outbreak of war and was instrumental in helping to organize the rapidly growing volunteer army of the North. A friend and colleague of McClellan, Buell was quickly given one of the most important field posts in the North, command of the Army of the Ohio. He was charged with defending Kentucky and advancing into the important central theater of operations that lay between the Mississippi Valley and the Appalachian Highlands.

    Buell displayed his chief failing as a field commander in Kentucky, one which he shared with McClellan, which was a far too healthy respect for the possibility of failure. He initiated no offensives during the winter of 1861-62, preferring to wait for dry spring weather to put into operation his plan to advance to Nashville. But Grant's spectacular victory at Fort Donelson cleared Buell's path by forcing the Confederates to abandon their positions in southern Kentucky and concentrate at Corinth. Thus the Army of the Ohio occupied a Confederate state capital it did not have to fight for. Buell agreed to combine his army with Grant's at Pittsburg Landing, abandoning for the time the central theater of operations. It gave him the opportunity to lead the army in its first battle on April 7, 1862. The second day at Shiloh was not nearly as deadly or prolonged as the first day had been, but it introduced the men of Buell's army to combat.

    After Halleck's capture of Corinth, Buell was once again given the opportunity to lead an independent offensive into Rebel territory. He moved his headquarters from Corinth in mid-June and by the end of the month was safely at Huntsville, having traveled along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Buell decided to make his headquarters there, where Mitchell's division already had established its base. He posted his six divisions, totaling about forty thousand men, as they arrived from Corinth. Maj. Gen. Alexander McDowell McCook's Second Division and Maj. Gen. Thomas Leonidas Crittenden's Fifth Division were sent to a point east of Stevenson where Battle Creek flowed into the Tennessee River. The railroad eastward from Huntsville passed through Stevenson and continued along the valley of the Tennessee to Chattanooga. This route was the most direct line of advance to the strategic mountain town. By positioning half of his army at the mouth of Battle Creek, Buell could protect Stevenson where the Memphis and Charleston line connected with the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. These were the two lines he was determined to use on his campaign to Chattanooga. They gave him flexibility--he could receive reinforcements and supplies from the Mississippi Valley or from Nashville, and if one line was cut by cavalry raiders or guerrillas the other might provide enough supplies to keep his army in the field. Battle Creek would also be the closest point any of Buell's men would be stationed to Chattanooga, which was about thirty miles away. McCook and Crittenden assumed their posts there by mid-July.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from Banners to the Breeze by EARL J. HESS. Copyright © 2000 by University of Nebraska Press. Excerpted by permission. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.

Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 2000-09-01:
Hess's study is a balanced, thoughtful account of three separate Civil War campaigns--in effect, a summary of military operations between the Appalachians and the Mississippi during the second half of 1862, minus the Vicksburg campaign. Union generals, through the exigencies of logistics, lost the initiative and Confederate General Braxton Bragg seized it, taking his army from Mississippi to Kentucky in a movement unprecedented in the annals of warfare. Then, let down by the people of Kentucky, his own generals, and perhaps his personal lack of resoluteness, Bragg retreated. Meanwhile the forces he left in Mississippi blundered to defeat at Corinth. The victor of Corinth, Union General William Rosecrans, rose to independent army command and at the turn of the year wrested a hard-fought victory from Bragg at Stones River. Hess's account is superbly fairminded. The requirements of the series of which this book is part handed him this assortment of campaigns; including Stones River in a book on the Kentucky and Corinth campaigns is at best a clumsy arrangement. Still, Hess carries it off as well as it could possibly be done, and the final result is definitely worthwhile. All levels. S. E. Woodworth; Texas Christian University
Reviews
Review Quotes
"Hess''s study is a balanced, thoughtful account of three separate Civil War campaigns. . . . Hess''s account is superbly fairminded. . . . The final result is definitely worthwhile. All levels."-Choice
"Hess''s study is a balanced, thoughtful account of three separate Civil War campaigns. . . . Hess''s account is superbly fairminded. . . . The final result is definitely worthwhile. All levels." Choice
"Earl J. Hess has produced a comprehensive, accurate, and insightful combined study of three of the Civil War's most dramatic and important campaigns."-Steven E. Woodworth, author ofChickamauga: A Battlefield Guide. "Like all of Hess's books, this one is marvelously done. I am especially pleased with his treatment of Iuka and Corinth."--Herman Hattaway, author ofShades of Blue and Gray: An Introductory Military History of the Civil War.
"The University of Nebraska series features professional historians who eschew the traditional narrow tactical study, and instead examine the military operations within a wider political and social context. The books are synthetic works that use the most recent scholarship in providing a comprehensive overview of the campaigns. . . . Hess meet[s] this formidable challenge."-Mark Bradley, Civil War History
"Without a doubt, Earl J Hess'sBanners to the Breezeis one of the finest Civil War campaign histories ever written..A welcome addition to the Great Campaigns of the Civil War series and necessary for a thorough understanding of the importance of the western theater to the defeat of the Confederacy."--Indiana Magazine of History
"Without a doubt, Earl J Hess's Banners to the Breeze is one of the finest Civil War campaign histories ever written. . . . A welcome addition to the Great Campaigns of the Civil War series and necessary for a thorough understanding of the importance of the western theater to the defeat of the Confederacy." Indiana Magazine of History
"The University of Nebraska series features professional historians who eschew the traditional narrow tactical study, and instead examine the military operations within a wider political and social context. The books are synthetic works that use the most recent scholarship in providing a comprehensive overview of the campaigns.... Hess meet[s] this formidable challenge."--Mark Bradley,Civil War History
"The University of Nebraska series features professional historians who eschew the traditional narrow tactical study, and instead examine the military operations within a wider political and social context. The books are synthetic works that use the most recent scholarship in providing a comprehensive overview of the campaigns. . . . Hess meet[s] this formidable challenge."Mark Bradley, Civil War History
"Earl J. Hess has produced a comprehensive, accurate, and insightful combined study of three of the Civil War's most dramatic and important campaigns." - Steven E. Woodworth, author of 'Chickamauga: A Battlefield Guide' "Like all of Hess's books, this one is marvelously done. I am especially pleased with his treatment of Iuka and Corinth." - Herman Hattaway, author of 'Shades of Blue and Gray: An Introductory Military History of the Civil War'
"Like all of Hess's books, this one is marvelously done. I am especially pleased with his treatment of Iuka and Corinth."Herman Hattaway, author of Shades of Blue and Gray: An Introductory Military History of the Civil War
"Without a doubt, Earl J Hess's Banners to the Breeze is one of the finest Civil War campaign histories ever written. . . . A welcome addition to the Great Campaigns of the Civil War series and necessary for a thorough understanding of the importance of the western theater to the defeat of the Confederacy."-Indiana Magazine of History
"Without a doubt, Earl J Hess'sBanners to the Breezeis one of the finest Civil War campaign histories ever written....A welcome addition to the Great Campaigns of the Civil War series and necessary for a thorough understanding of the importance of the western theater to the defeat of the Confederacy."--Indiana Magazine of History
"The University of Nebraska series features professional historians who eschew the traditional narrow tactical study, and instead examine the military operations within a wider political and social context. The books are synthetic works that use the most recent scholarship in providing a comprehensive overview of the campaigns.. Hess meet[s] this formidable challenge."--Mark Bradley,Civil War History
"Hess's study is a balanced, thoughtful account of three separate Civil War campaigns. . . . Hess's account is superbly fairminded. . . . The final result is definitely worthwhile. All levels."--Choice
"Earl J. Hess has produced a comprehensive, accurate, and insightful combined study of three of the Civil War's most dramatic and important campaigns."Steven E. Woodworth, author ofChickamauga: A Battlefield Guide. "Like all of Hess's books, this one is marvelously done. I am especially pleased with his treatment of Iuka and Corinth."--Herman Hattaway, author ofShades of Blue and Gray: An Introductory Military History of the Civil War.
"A well-written book. It is informative and objective. The author comments on the shortcomings of both sides with sound reasoning. His descriptions of the movements of the various forces are detailed and point out the difficulties encountered. This book contains far more than just the stories of these three battles. I recommend this excellent book to all Civil War readers."-Duane A. Benell, Civil War Courier
"A concise synthesis of recent Civil War scholarship.. Persons interested in one of these campaigns would do well to start their study with this book. Scholars in the field will find some of the observations about commanders a good point of departure for future academic debate."--Damon Eubank,West Virginia History.
"A concise synthesis of recent Civil War scholarship.... Persons interested in one of these campaigns would do well to start their study with this book. Scholars in the field will find some of the observations about commanders a good point of departure for future academic debate."--Damon Eubank,West Virginia History.
"A concise synthesis of recent Civil War scholarship. . . . Persons interested in one of these campaigns would do well to start their study with this book. Scholars in the field will find some of the observations about commanders a good point of departure for future academic debate."-Damon Eubank, West Virginia History
"A well-written book. It is informative and objective. The author comments on the shortcomings of both sides with sound reasoning. His descriptions of the movements of the various forces are detailed and point out the difficulties encountered. This book contains far more than just the stories of these three battles. I recommend this excellent book to all Civil War readers."--Duane A. Benell,Civil War Courier
"Like all of Hess's books, this one is marvelously done. I am especially pleased with his treatment of Iuka and Corinth."-Herman Hattaway, author of Shades of Blue and Gray: An Introductory Military History of the Civil War
"A well-written book. It is informative and objective. The author comments on the shortcomings of both sides with sound reasoning. His descriptions of the movements of the various forces are detailed and point out the difficulties encountered. This book contains far more than just the stories of these three battles. I recommend this excellent book to all Civil War readers."Duane A. Benell, Civil War Courier
"A concise synthesis of recent Civil War scholarship. . . . Persons interested in one of these campaigns would do well to start their study with this book. Scholars in the field will find some of the observations about commanders a good point of departure for future academic debate."Damon Eubank, West Virginia History
This item was reviewed in:
Choice, September 2000
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Summaries
Main Description
Banners to the Breezeanalyzes three major Civil War campaigns that were conducted following a series of devastating Confederate defeats at the hands of Ulysses S. Grant in the spring of 1862. After the recapture of Tennessee, Confederate armies under Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith conducted a brilliant advance into the deeply divided state of Kentucky. Meanwhile, other Confederate forces under Sterling Price and Earl Van Dorn attempted to recapture the town of Corinth, Mississippi. As the year drew to a close, Bragg's army was involved in a tactical draw at the battle of Stones River. Earl J. Hess mixes dramatic narrative and new analysis as he brings these campaigns together in a coherent whole. Previously unpublished historic photographs of the battlefields are included.
Main Description
'Banners to the breeze' analyses three major Civil War campaigns that were conducted following a series of devastating Confederate defeats at the hands of Ulysses S. Grant in the spring of 1862. After the recapture of Tennessee, Confederate armies under Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith conducted a brilliant advance into the deeply divided state of Kentucky. Meanwhile, other Confederate forces under Sterling Price and Earl Van Dorn attempted to recapture the town of Corinth, Mississippi. As the year drew to a close, Bragg's army was involved in a tactical draw at the battle of Stones River. Earl J. Hess mixes dramatic narrative and new analysis as he brings these campaigns together in a coherent whole. Previously unpublished historic photographs of the battlefields are included. Earl J. Hess is an associate professor of history at Lincoln Memorial University in Harrogate, Tennessee. He is the author of The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat and other works.
Bowker Data Service Summary
This work analyses three major Civil War campaigns that were conducted following a series of devastating Confederate defeats at the hands of Ulysses S. Grant in the spring of 1862.
Main Description
Banners to the Breeze analyzes three major Civil War campaigns that were conducted following a series of devastating Confederate defeats at the hands of Ulysses S. Grant in the spring of 1862. After the recapture of Tennessee, Confederate armies under Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith conducted a brilliant advance into the deeply divided state of Kentucky. Meanwhile, other Confederate forces under Sterling Price and Earl Van Dorn attempted to recapture the town of Corinth, Mississippi. As the year drew to a close, Bragg's army was involved in a tactical draw at the battle of Stones River. Earl J. Hess mixes dramatic narrative and new analysis as he brings these campaigns together in a coherent whole. Previously unpublished historic photographs of the battlefields are included.
Publisher Fact Sheet
Analyzes three major Civil War campaigns that were conducted following a series of devastating Confederate defeats in 1862 bringing them together as a coherent whole. This volume includes previously unpublished historical battlefield photographs.
Table of Contents
Series Editors' Introductionp. xi
Prefacep. xiii
Banners to the Breezep. 1
Bold Strike into the Bluegrassp. 30
Bragg, Buell, and Kentuckyp. 56
Give Him Battlep. 77
Perryvillep. 92
Good-Bye, Kentuckyp. 106
the Road to Iukap. 121
Corinthp. 141
Bloody Octoberp. 154
on to Murfreesborop. 177
Stones Riverp. 197
Fight or Diep. 216
Notesp. 235
Bibliographical Essayp. 243
Indexp. 245
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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