Japan's political marketplace /
J. Mark Ramseyer, Frances McCall Rosenbluth.
Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1993.
viii, 262 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
0674472802 (alk. paper)
More Details
Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1993.
0674472802 (alk. paper)
catalogue key
Includes bibliographical references (p. [228]-254) and index.
A Look Inside
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 1993-11:
Ramseyer (Univ. of Chicago) and Rosenbluth (Univ. of California, Los Angeles) make a welcome addition to the burgeoning literature on Japanese political culture with solid analysis of Japan's "money politics" and of the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) use of existing election rules to perpetuate its majority rule. The book's premise is that the LDP has been able to significantly enhance its candidates' electoral chances with its control of the government through bureaucratic intervention, in-kind gifts, and "pork." Political scientists have long held that nearly 40 years of rule by the LDP have taken political clout away from the Diet (parliament) and put it in the hands of the bureaucracy and the LDP. In an interesting, if controversial, break from decades of Japanese studies, the authors dispute the widely held belief that bureaucrats are equal to the LDP. They argue that the LDP effectively enforces its policy preferences on bureaucrats and judges because the LDP's legislative veto over any bureaucratic action always gives it the last word. Advanced undergraduate through faculty. R. J. Carraro; Center for Asian Pacific Affairs
Review Quotes
[A] Well researched and carefully thought out study of Japanese politics.
Fodder for scholarly research for years to come.
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth present a view of Japanese politics that coherently links voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and judges into patterns of interaction governed by the logic of the 'political marketplace.' They succeed in demonstrating that many of the analytical tools developed to study the politics of advanced Western democracies are not only applicable in the Japanese context, but also are capable of yielding novel interpretations of politics in Japan.
This item was reviewed in:
Choice, November 1993
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Main Description
Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth show how rational-choice theory can be applied to Japanese politics. Using the concept of principal and agent,Ramseyer
Table of Contents
Electoral Rules and Party Strategy
Demographics and Policy
Party Factions
Party Organization
Political Structure and Bureaucratic Incentives
Bureaucratic Manipulation
Political Structure and Judicial Incentives
Judicial Manipulation
Conclusion: Political Markets and Electoral Change
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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