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Tracking the axis enemy : the triumph of Anglo-American naval intelligence /
Alan Harris Bath.
imprint
Lawrence, KS : University Press of Kansas, c1998.
description
xii, 308 p. ; 24 cm.
ISBN
0700609172 (alk. paper)
format(s)
Book
Holdings
More Details
series title
imprint
Lawrence, KS : University Press of Kansas, c1998.
isbn
0700609172 (alk. paper)
catalogue key
2389621
 
Includes bibliographical references (p. 277-287) and index.
A Look Inside
About the Author
Author Affiliation
Alan Harris Bath served in the U.S. Navy from 1951 through 1983. His assignments included commanding officer, Fleet Intelligence Center, Europe and Atlantic; deputy director for intelligence, U.S. European Command; and commanding officer, U.S. Naval Investigative Service, Pacific Area
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 1999-03-01:
The intelligence services of the British and American navies shared many very exciting moments during WW II, among them tracking German U-boats across the Atlantic, breaking the ULTRA and Purple codes, and sponsoring the coast-watchers in the South Pacific. Such adventures are only mentioned briefly in this book. Instead, Bath offers an exhaustively detailed survey of the administrative frameworks that linked--or failed to link--the two navies. Most vivid are his descriptions of internal battles--between Britons and Americans, between armies and navies, and within various naval commands. Rather than the "Axis enemy" of the book's title, the "tracking" here is mostly of "suspicious allies and bureaucratic rivals." Although this internecine wrangling is hardly thrilling, Bath's work will be useful to historians investigating intelligence services during the war. He follows all the many persons in charge of different naval intelligence agencies, singling out British Admiral Sir John Godfrey, whose "personal diplomacy" helped sort out some of the worst disputes, and his assistant Commander Ian Fleming--whose actual role in intelligence was infinitely duller than that of his fictional creation, James Bond. Upper-division undergraduates and above. J. R. Breihan; Loyola College
Reviews
This item was reviewed in:
Choice, March 1999
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Summaries
Bowker Data Service Summary
This is an in-depth study of the nature, evolution and impact of information sharing by Allied navies during WW2. It shows how the Anglo-American political and cultural bonds shaped intelligence operations and the nature of military campaigns.
Main Description
The 1942-43 naval campaign against German U-boats known as the Battle of the Atlantic was a major victory not only for Allied warships but also for naval intelligence. Thanks to the coordinated efforts of submarine tracking rooms in London, Washington, and Ottawa, the antisubmarine forces search-and-destroy missions helped preserve the safety of the seaways. Naval intelligence has been an aspect of World War II that has received scant attention. Now former naval intelligence officer Alan Harris Bath traces the coordination of Anglo-American efforts before and during the war, identifying the political, military, technological, and human factors that aided and sometimes hindered cooperation. He compares the two nations different and often conflicting styles of intelligence gathering and reveals ways in which interagency and interservice rivalries complicated an already complex process. Drawing on archives in the U.S., U.K., and British Commonwealth, Bath describes h ow cooperation took place at all levels of decision-making, in all theaters of war, and at all points in the intelligence cycle, from gathering through analysis to dissemination. He tells how the U.S. learned from Britains longer experience in the war and how intelligence cooperation was always subordinated to Anglo-American political relations-and how in the final months of fighting intelligence cooperation was impeded by the governments post-war agendas. Although victory in the Atlantic was the capstone of this cooperative endeavor, Bath also describes how intelligence relationships fared in the South Pacific, not only between the forces of Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur but also with those of Australia and New Zealand. Throughout the book, he emphasizes the contributions of Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian naval intelligence to this cooperative effort. As the first in-depth study of the nature, evolution, and impact of information sharing by Allied navies, Tracking the Axis Enemy is essential reading for historians and buffs alike. By showing how the Anglo-American political and cultural bonds shaped intelligence operations and how those operations shaped campaigns, it contributes a new perspective on the Allied victory.
Unpaid Annotation
The 1942-43 naval campaign against German U-boats known as the Battle of the Atlantic was a major victory not only for Allied warships but also for naval intelligence. Thanks to the coordinated efforts of submarine tracking rooms in London, Washington, and Ottawa, the antisubmarine forces' march-and-destroy missions helped preserve the safety of the seaways.Naval intelligence has been an aspect of World War II that has received scant attention. Now former naval intelligence officer Alan Harris Bath traces the coordination of Anglo-American efforts before and during the war, identifying the political, military, technological, and human factors that aided and sometimes hindered cooperation. He compares the two nations' different and often conflicting styles of intelligence gathering and reveals ways in which interagency and interservice rivalries complicated an already complex process.Drawing on archives in the U.S., U.K., and British Commonwealth, Bath describes how cooperation took place atall levels,of decision-making, in all theaters of war, and at all points in the intelligence cycle, from gathering through analysis to dissemination. He tells how the U.S. learned from Britain's longer experience in the war and how intelligence cooperation was always subordinated to Anglo-American political relations -- and how in the final months of fighting intelligence cooperation was impeded by the governments' postwar agendas.Although victory in the Atlantic was the capstone of this cooperative endeavor, Bath also describes how intelligence relationships fared in the South Pacific, not only between the forces of Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur but also with those of Australia andNew Zealand. Throughout the book, he emphasizes the contributions of Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian naval intelligence to this cooperative effort.As the first in-depth study of the nature, evolution, and impact of in
Table of Contents
Prefacep. xi
The Road to Cooperation
Uneasy Beginningsp. 3
Changing Attitudesp. 17
Forging Aheadp. 40
Growth of Wartime Cooperationp. 68
Culmination and Turning Point
The Culminationp. 97
Cracks in the Structurep. 118
The Pacific
Interwar Faltering Stepsp. 135
Too Little, Too Latep. 150
Organizing for Cooperationp. 169
"Support" Vice "Cooperation"p. 187
Denouement of Wartime Alliances
Twilight of Cooperationp. 211
In Retrospectp. 227
Notesp. 235
Selected Bibliographyp. 277
Indexp. 289
Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved.

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