Deterrence and strategic culture : Chinese-American confrontations, 1949-1958 /
Shu Guang Zhang.
Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1992.
xiii, 302 p. : maps ; 25 cm.
0801427517 (alk. paper)
More Details
Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1992.
0801427517 (alk. paper)
catalogue key
Includes bibliographical references (p. 284-297) and index.
A Look Inside
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 1993-06:
An impressive attempt to apply deterrence theory to Sino-American confrontations between 1949 and 1958. Drawing on newly available Chinese and US sources, Zhang examines seven cases of conflict between Beijing and Washington in Korea, Indochina, and the Taiwan Strait. What emerges from his account is a mutual deterrence relationship. Zhang argues that neither Beijing nor Washington had aggressive designs against the other, but both sides failed to understand that. According to Zhang, cultural differences regarding national security and ignorance of those differences explained misperceptions and distortions, thus contributing to confrontations. By stressing the defensive nature of Chinese and American policies, however, Zhang underestimates the role of ideology in decision making. As recent scholarship by Chen Jian suggests, Mao Zedong's initial decision to enter the Korean War was more than defensive. The Chinese leader intended to drive the Americans out of the Korean peninsula. Neverthless, this fine interdisciplinary history is a welcome addition to the study of Cold War Sino-American relations. Recommended. Advanced undergraduate; graduate; faculty; professional. Q. Zhai; Auburn University at Montgomery
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Choice, June 1993
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Main Description
Does strategic thinking on the question of deterrence vary between cultures? Should practitioners assume a common understanding of deterrence regardless of national and cultural differences? Shu Guang Zhang takes on these questions by exploring Sino-American confrontations between 1949 and 1958. Zhang draws on recently declassified U.S. documents and previously inaccessible Chinese Communist Party records to demonstrate that the Chinese and the Americans had vastly different assessments of each other's intentions, interests, threats, strengths, and policies during this period.
Table of Contents
Mutual Deterrence and Standard Modelsp. 1
The Establishment of the Battleground, 1948-1950p. 13
The Origins of the Taiwan Question, September 1949-August 1950p. 46
Military Conflict in Korea, July 1950-January 1951p. 79
The End of the Korean War, 1952-1953p. 118
Confrontation in Indochina, 1953-1954p. 152
The First Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1954-1955p. 189
The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1958p. 225
Misperception and Mutual Deterrencep. 268
Bibliographyp. 284
Indexp. 299
Table of Contents provided by Blackwell. All Rights Reserved.

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