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Trade threats, trade wars [electronic resource] : bargaining, retaliation, and American coercive diplomacy /
Ka Zeng.
imprint
Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, c2004.
description
viii, 312 p. : ill.
ISBN
0472113585 (cloth : alk. paper)
format(s)
Book
More Details
added author
imprint
Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, c2004.
isbn
0472113585 (cloth : alk. paper)
restrictions
Licensed for access by U. of T. users.
catalogue key
12531337
 
Includes bibliographical references (p. 281-298) and index.
A Look Inside
About the Author
Author Affiliation
Ka Zeng is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Arkansas.
Full Text Reviews
Appeared in Choice on 2004-12-01:
There is a rich literature on the political economy of trade policy, usually centered on the political power of protectionist and free-trade economic interests. These interests are brought to bear on a country's negotiating positions in international trade talks. This political-economic battle is particularly important to the US, which has been instrumental in launching every major multilateral trade negotiation since the 1930s. Zeng (political science, Univ. of Arkansas) offers a novel angle on this issue. He argues that when there is a great deal of overlap in traded products between the US and a trading partner, this competitive trade relationship tends to lead to a protectionist stance because both import-competing industries (seeking protection) and export industries (finding it difficult to penetrate the foreign market) tend to oppose trade liberalization. On the other hand, when the US has a complementary trade relationship with another country (when their production structure is different), both sides tend to favor trade liberalization. The author uses this construct to explain US trade negotiating positions and the ability of the US to extract trade concessions from different countries. Following the conceptual political-economic model, Zeng presents empirical evidence and then links the entire story to trade policy formation in a democracy. ^BSumming Up: Highly recommended. College and university libraries. I. Walter New York University
Reviews
Review Quotes
". . . Zeng has focused on a body of practical wisdom that has considerable explanatory power in contemporary trade politics." - --Political Science Quarterly
This item was reviewed in:
Choice, December 2004
To find out how to look for other reviews, please see our guides to finding book reviews in the Sciences or Social Sciences and Humanities.
Summaries
Bowker Data Service Summary
This study addresses the inconsistencies of American trade policy, with regard to both the tactics employed & the results achieved. Ka Zeng finds that differences reflect whether the trade relationship is basically competitive or complementary.
Main Description
This study of American trade policy addresses two puzzles associated with the use of aggressive bargaining tactics to open foreign markets. First, as the country with greater power and resources, why has the United States achieved more success in extracting concessions from some of its trading partners than others? Second, why is it that trade disputes between democratic and authoritarian states do not more frequently spark retaliatory actions than those between democratic pairs? Ka Zeng finds answers to both of these questions in the domestic repercussions of the structure of trade between the United States and its trading partners, whether the United States has a competitive trade relationship with its trading partner, or whether trade is complementary. This book offers practical policy prescriptions that promise to be of interest to trade policymakers and students of international trade policy. Ka Zeng is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
Main Description
This study of American trade policy addresses two puzzles associated with the use of aggressive bargaining tactics to open foreign markets. First, as the country with greater power and resources, why has the United States achieved more success in extracting concessions from some of its trading partners than others? Second, why is it that trade disputes between democratic and authoritarian states do not more frequently spark retaliatory actions than those between democratic pairs? Ka Zeng finds answers to both of these questions in the domestic repercussions of the structure of trade between the United States and its trading partners, whether the United States has a competitivetrade relationship with its trading partner, or whether trade is complementary. This book offers practical policy prescriptions that promise to be of interest to trade policymakers and students of international trade policy. Ka Zeng is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
Main Description
This study of American trade policy addresses two puzzles associated with the use of aggressive bargaining tactics to open foreign markets. First, as the country with greater power and resources, why has the United States achieved more success in extracting concessions from some of its trading partners than others? Second, why is it that trade disputes between democratic and authoritarian states do not more frequently spark retaliatory actions than those between democratic pairs? Ka Zeng finds answers to both of these questions in the domestic repercussions of the structure of trade between the United States and its trading partners, whether the United States has acompetitivetrade relationship with its trading partner, or whether trade iscomplementary. This book offers practical policy prescriptions that promise to be of interest to trade policymakers and students of international trade policy. Ka Zeng is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
Table of Contents
List of Figures and List of Tablesp. vii
Introductionp. 1
Trade Structure, Threat Effectiveness, and "Democratic Trade Peace"p. 26
The Empirical Recordp. 54
American Threats and U.S.-China Negotiations over Most-Favored-Nation Status and Market Accessp. 91
U.S.-Japan Trade Conflicts: Semiconductors and Super 301p. 127
U.S.-China "Trade Peace": Intellectual Property Rights and Textilesp. 168
Democracy and Trade Conflictsp. 196
Conclusionp. 229
Notesp. 253
Bibliographyp. 281
Indexp. 299
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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