Catalogue


Occupying Iraq [electronic resource] : a history of the Coalition Provisional Authority /
James Dobbins ... [et al.].
imprint
Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corp., 2009.
description
xlvi, 364 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
ISBN
0833046659 (pbk. : alk. paper), 9780833046659 (pbk. : alk. paper)
format(s)
Book
More Details
added author
imprint
Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corp., 2009.
isbn
0833046659 (pbk. : alk. paper)
9780833046659 (pbk. : alk. paper)
restrictions
Licensed for access by U. of T. users.
contents note
The origin of the CPA -- Building the CPA -- Creating the Governing Council -- Establishing security -- Governing Iraq -- Promoting the rule of law -- Growing the economy -- Running the CPA -- Promoting democracy -- Disarming militias and countering insurgents -- Exit and appraisal.
general note
"MG-847-CC"--P. [4] of cover.
"The research described in this report was sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division."
abstract
"The American engagement in Iraq has been looked at from many perspectives: the flawed intelligence that provided the war's rationale, the failed effort to secure an international mandate, the rapid success of the invasion, and the long ensuing counterinsurgency campaign. This book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its administrator, L. Paul Bremer, who governed Iraq from May 2003 to June of the following year. It is based on interviews with many of those responsible for setting and implementing occupation policy, on the memoirs of American and Iraqi officials who have since left office, on journalists' accounts of the period, and on nearly 100,000 never-before-released CPA documents. The book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, reform the judicial and penal systems, fight corruption, revitalize the economy, and create the basis for representative government. It also addresses the occupation's most striking failure: the inability of the United States and its coalition partners to protect the Iraqi people from the criminals and extremists in their midst." --P. [4] of cover.
catalogue key
11414324
 
Includes bibliographical references (p. 335-340) and index.
A Look Inside
Summaries
Main Description
This book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its administrator, L. Paul Bremer, who governed Iraq from May 2003 to June of the following year. Utilizing first-hand accounts and nearly 100,000 never-before-released CPA documents, the book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, reform the judicial and penal systems, fight corruption, revitalize the economy, and create the basis for representative government. It also goes beyond this compelling analysis to address the occupation's most striking failure: the inability of the United States and its coalition partners to protect the Iraqi people from the criminals and extremists in their midst. Book jacket.
Library of Congress Summary
"The American engagement in Iraq has been looked at from many perspectives: the flawed intelligence that provided the war's rationale, the failed effort to secure an international mandate, the rapid success of the invasion, and the long ensuing counterinsurgency campaign. This book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its administrator, L. Paul Bremer, who governed Iraq from May 2003 to June of the following year. It is based on interviews with many of those responsible for setting and implementing occupation policy, on the memoirs of American and Iraqi officials who have since left office, on journalists' accounts of the period, and on nearly 100,000 never-before-released CPA documents. The book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, reform the judicial and penal systems, fight corruption, revitalize the economy, and create the basis for representative government. It also addresses the occupation's most striking failure: the inability of the United States and its coalition partners to protect the Iraqi people from the criminals and extremists in their midst." --P. [4] of cover.
Main Description
Focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority during the first year of the occupation of Iraq. Based on interviews and nearly 100,000 never-before-released documents from CPA archives, the book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, counter a burgeoning insurgency, and create the basis for representative government.
Table of Contents
Prefacep. iii
Figuresp. xi
Summaryp. xiii
Abbreviationsp. xlv
The Origin of the CPAp. 1
Building the CPAp. 11
Legal Basisp. 12
The Chain of Commandp. 14
Staffing and Organizationp. 20
Early Decisionsp. 28
Conclusionp. 28
Creating the Governing Councilp. 31
Forming the Governance Teamp. 32
Planning for an Iraqi Interim Authorityp. 34
From Interim Authority to Governing Councilp. 39
Conclusionp. 47
Establishing Securityp. 51
Disbanding the Armyp. 52
Building the New Armyp. 61
Reforming the Policep. 71
Dealing with Neighbors: Iran, Syria, and Turkeyp. 81
Iranp. 82
Syriap. 87
Turkeyp. 89
Countering the Insurgencyp. 92
Conclusionp. 102
Governing Iraqp. 107
De-Ba'athificationp. 112
Electricityp. 119
Health Carep. 126
Educationp. 130
Local Governmentp. 137
Conclusionp. 145
Promoting the Rule of Lawp. 149
Establishing the Judiciaryp. 153
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanityp. 158
Capturing Saddamp. 161
Handling Detaineesp. 164
Abu Ghraibp. 167
Fighting Corruptionp. 173
Charges of CPA Financial Mismanagementp. 177
Oil for Foodp. 182
Freedom of the Pressp. 186
Conclusionp. 195
Growing the Economyp. 197
Macroeconomic Stabilizationp. 198
Issuing New Currencyp. 203
Reforming the Banksp. 205
Debt Reliefp. 211
Promoting Foreign Investmentp. 212
Reducing Subsidiesp. 217
Energyp. 217
Foodp. 220
State-Owned Enterprisesp. 223
Expanding Employmentp. 227
Promoting Long-Term Developmentp. 233
Conclusionp. 238
Running the CPAp. 243
Staffing Shortagesp. 244
Difficulties in Coordinationp. 253
Funding Constraintsp. 254
Inadequate Outreachp. 257
Reorganizing the CPAp. 260
Conclusionp. 263
Promoting Democracyp. 265
Seven Steps to Sovereigntyp. 266
Stepping on the Gasp. 271
Building Iraqi Capacityp. 275
Working at the Grassrootsp. 282
The Return of the United Nationsp. 286
Drafting an Interim Constitutionp. 289
Conclusionp. 294
Disarming Militias and Countering Insurgentsp. 297
Muqtada al-Sadrp. 297
Fallujahp. 307
Disarming Militiasp. 315
Conclusionp. 320
Exit and Appraisalp. 323
Mission Accomplished or Mission Impossible?p. 326
Bibliographyp. 335
Indexp. 341
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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