Catalogue

This book is among the more informative opening salvos of the centenary of the Anglo-Boer War. Its introduction and 12 essays are part of an ongoing reevaluation of the causes and consequences of the war. Peter Henshaw's opening chapter on "origins" neatly summarizes most of the existing literature, charting a careful explanatory course between grand imperial strategy (and pre-emptive acts on the part of Britain) and the agency and design of Sir Alfred Milner. The motives of the various individual actors were different, with those in the field, and even some at home, scheming at cross-purposes with the decision-makers in London. Imperial issues are the subject of most of the chapters; there are insights into the machinations and considerations concerning the war of Germany, Portugal, Austria-Hungary, France, and even the US. The Delagoa Bay (Maputo) question is well considered, and the various diplomatic compromises and trade-offs are reexamined in interesting ways. But there is no chapter on the Transvaal. After all, it fired the first shots at a time when war was likely given Milner's jingoism, but not inevitable. Lord Salisbury, in London, was against war over gold or Uitlanders, as were most of his cabinet and much of the British public. Upper-division undergraduates and above. R. I. Rotberg Harvard University