Institutions and stakeholder influence on CEO compensation and corporate social responsibility /
by Muhammad Umar Aabid Boodoo.
ix, 152 leaves : illustrations ; 29 cm.
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contents note
Introduction -- 1. Do heavily-unionized companies compensate their CEOs less in periods of financial distress?: evidence from Canadian companies during the financial crisis -- 2. The influence of unions on companies' CSR profiles: more internal policies and programs, but not always at the expense of external endeavours -- 3. Does mandatory CSR reporting regulation lead to improved Corporate Social Performance?: evidence from India -- Conclusion -- Appendices. A: Results when using absolute instead of benchmarked return on assets as a determinant of CEO pay -- B: Description of CSP data from SustainAlytics -- C: Internal vs. external CSR measures -- D: Results when using CSR scores as weighted and calculated by SustainAlytics -- E: Indicators used to calculate Corporate Social Performance in India and the US.
dissertation note
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto, 2016.
This thesis of three (stand-alone) chapters centres around the premise that institutions and stakeholders influence corporate policy, in particular with regards to CEO Compensation, and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Chapter 1 focuses on the implicit regulation that unions may pose to corporate governance, and fins that during the financial crisis (2008-2011, union density at corporate level was positively related to non-equity components of CEO pay such as salary and pension contributions with no significant effects on equity components such as options and restricted stock units. These findings have some precedence in literature but they also go counter to more prominent theoretical predictions and empirical research which posit that unions should in fact reduce CEO compensation. Chapter 2 looks at the influence of unions on CSR profiles and, through the lenses of stakeholder and neo-institutional theories, finds that unions generally tend to gear companies towards more internal rather than external CSR. However, the observed effect of unions on the internal-external CSRS profile of companies is not linear. At low levels of unionization, there is a substitution effect where companies substitute internal for external CSR, but at higher levels of unionization, both elements complement and reinforce each other. Drawing from the employment relations literature, I propose that the complementary perhaps points to a labour-management relationship which is based on more equally-shared power, trust, and loyalty. Chapter 3 looks at the causal impact of regulatory changes on Corporate Social Performance. Using difference-in-difference techniques, I find that forcing companies to disclose CSR practices makes them improve their social performance. I attribute this finding to firms facing higher social pressures and firms being soft targets for activists given that their CSR practices become public information. Further, I find that the social and governance elements of CSR improve more than the environment aspect. This finding bodes well with stakeholder identification and salience theory, which posits that stakeholders who have power and whose claims are more legitimate and urgent will be given more attention by management. All three chapters reinforce the hypothesis that institutional pressure and stakeholder pressure have an impact on Corporate Policy. The data used in this thesis come from new and proprietary sources, and cover three different countries (Canada, the UK, and India), adding to the expansion of management literature.
catalogue key
Includes bibliographical references (pages 84-92).

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