Three essays on employment and compensation in China.
Xiu, Lin.
imprint
2010.
description
112 leaves.
ISBN
9780494723463
format(s)
Microform, Thesis
Holdings
More Details
author
imprint
2010.
isbn
9780494723463
restrictions
Electronic version licensed for access by U. of T. users.
dissertation note
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto, 2010.
general note
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-07, Section: A, page: .
local note
ROBARTS MICROTEXT copy on microfiche.
abstract
The three essays in this dissertation address two prominent labour market and human resource management issues in contemporary China: gender pay differentials; and pay-performance relationship in managerial compensation. Using three unique data sets, this dissertation examines three areas: the managerial gender pay gap in top corporate jobs; the effect of state ownership and managerial power on CEO compensation; and the gender pay compensation differentials in base pay, performance pay and total pay.The first chapter uses a unique data set from a survey of firms and managers in China to examine the managerial gender earnings gap in China. The results show that female managers receive much lower pay than male managers. A larger portion of the gender earnings gap can be attributable to firm-level characteristics than individual characteristics. Female managers tend to have fewer firm-level characteristics that are associated with higher pay, and when they do, they tend to receive a smaller pay premium for those characteristics.The second chapter uses a data set constructed for the study based on corporate annual reports. Results indicate that CEO compensation is positively related to the financial performance of the firms in both state controlled and non-state controlled firms. The compensation level, after controlling for various pay-determining factors, is higher in non-state controlled firms and for CEOs with greater managerial power. The strength of the pay-performance link is stronger in non-state owned firms compared to state owned firms (as indicated by the interaction between performance and state ownership). When state controlled firms and non-state controlled firms are analyzed separately, the pay-performance link is significantly weaker for CEOs with greater managerial power in non-state controlled firms, and weaker but not significantly so in state controlled firms (as indicated by the interaction terms between firm performance and managerial power variables). Whether CEOs are recruited from outside of the firm or from inside of the firm does not have an effect on either the CEO compensation level or the strength of the pay-performance link.The third chapter examines whether and how the gender pay gap varies across different pay schemes: base pay, performance pay and total pay. The results show that women receive about three-quarters of male pay for each of the dimensions of base pay, performance pay and total pay, before adjusting for the effect of different pay determining factors. Decomposition analysis of the different components of pay (base pay, performance pay and "other" pay) indicate that males earn about 30% more than females in total pay with the gender gap in performance pay (35%) and in "other" forms of pay (28%) both being greater than the gap in base pay (25.5%). The unexplained or potential discriminatory component, however, is smaller for performance pay and "other" forms of pay compared to base pay, suggesting that there is not more discriminatory discretion in the awarding of performance pay and the "other" forms of pay compared to base pay.
catalogue key
7911049

  link to old catalogue

Report a problem